2024年美国大选，特朗普第二度入主白宫，不仅在于其大量草根粉丝的选票、共和党建制派的力挺，还在于富豪埃隆·马斯克的“入局”和强援。正是这位跨航天、互联网、汽车多行业的商业巨头、世界首富，利用海量的资源及平台为特朗普摇旗呐喊，助推特朗普击败民调一度领先的哈里斯，重返白宫。

    近日，马斯克又激烈批判英国执政的工党政府，对其移民政策及对穆斯林犯罪问题的态度表达不满，并鼓动英国白人右翼民粹对抗政府。而更早时，马斯克也就德国政局、俄乌战争等国际议题多次发表争议言论，包括支持极右翼的“德国另类选择党”、为普京侵略辩护和批评乌克兰等。这反映了马斯克对政治的干预，已超越美国国界，成为正在影响并试图主导世界政治风向的富豪政客。而马斯克所“辅佐”的特朗普，也是商人出身、美国巨富。

   商人/富豪参与政治，有着独特的优势。首先，富豪出于经商致富的需要，总是会与各路政客打交道，对于政治和权力有着远超普通人的关心、了解、参与频率与干政能力。第二，富豪拥有常人乃至政治家都没有的巨额私人财富，可以转化为影响政治的巨大能量。第三，富豪之所以成为富豪，大多都有着过人的做事和待人能力，本身就有从政的底子，参与政治往往得心应手。而许多富豪有了巨额金钱，也往往会有超过物质的追求、更远大的理想，参与政治是其实现理想追求的绝佳途径。

   在20世纪，有不少商人/富豪涉足政治。其中，政治和意识形态色彩最浓厚、影响力又巨大的代表人物，是乔治·索罗斯。

   这位出生在匈牙利、在英国求学、之后又移居美国，历经纳粹统治、二战、冷战的犹太人富商，或许正是因自身曲折经历和多重身份，对参与政治、改变世界有强烈渴望。成为巨富后，索罗斯将大量财产和资源用于支持美国及其他国家特定政治团体。

  索罗斯在美国旗帜鲜明的支持民主党和进步主义，如2008和2012年有力助推奥巴马当选总统、2016年鼎力支持希拉里竞选总统。在国际上，则致力于支持各专制国家反对派、促进自由民主与“开放社会”。他还在出生地布达佩斯创办了“中欧大学”，培养致力自由与进步的青年人。索罗斯对女权、LGBT、环保、少数和弱势族群权利问题也都颇为支持。

  索罗斯的种种活动，产生很大影响，取得不少实际成果，也带来巨大争议。美欧民主国家的右翼人士批判其是操纵各国政治、藏在建制派政客幕后的“深层政府”首脑；中俄在内非民主国家，则指责其干涉各国内政。

   除了索罗斯，比尔盖茨、巴菲特等人也都对公共事业颇有参与，但政治色彩相对较淡、立场较中立。

   而今日的马斯克，与索罗斯同为商人、巨富，也都对政治充满热情，但价值观和立场却是截然相反的。马斯克旗帜鲜明的支持共和党和右翼，且有较强民粹色彩，反对民主党和进步派。在国际上，马斯克倾向支持普京的俄罗斯等专制威权势力，并策应欧洲右翼民粹的崛起。和索罗斯相互厌恶的匈牙利总理欧尔班，就和马斯克过从甚密，二人在特朗普的海湖庄园共进晚餐。马斯克也更支持欧美白人本位主义、本土优先主义。虽然马斯克和索罗斯都强调对“自由”的尊崇和捍卫，但二者对“自由”的内容定义、判断标准、适用对象，是大相径庭的。

  相较于索罗斯的理想主义，马斯克更强调利益至上和效率优先，有强烈的社会达尔文主义色彩。也可以说，马斯克将效率和社达作为了理想，并希望通过影响政府政策和公民社会，让更多人都接受和遵循。

  相较于索罗斯虽然激进但往往遵循法律和程序、日常言行也较谨慎的风格，马斯克也更加个性鲜明、我行我素、天马行空。如其收购推特、改名为“ X”及推动“X”内容风格变革，在研发“SpaceX”星舰中的冒险行为、在美国和国际政治上的出位发言等。其中一些创新和冒险精神令人赞叹，另一些则让人忧虑和不安。

   但无论索罗斯还是马斯克，都强烈扰动了美国和其他不少国家的政治，还成为美国总统这一世界最有权势职位的“造王者”，显示了工商富豪强大的影响力。马斯克在特朗普当选总统后，一系列深度涉入特朗普候任团队政治决策的行为（如最近H1B签证问题、人事任命问题，还和特朗普基层支持者发生分歧和论战），也让许多人对其以商人身份干政、官商利益输送产生强烈担忧。近来连特朗普阵营内部都对马斯克“干政”强烈质疑。马斯克及美国右翼民粹频繁批判索罗斯作为商人操纵美国政治，如今马斯克自己也陷入相同争议，也令人感慨和感到讽刺。

  而在俄罗斯、中国等大国，同样曾有过名噪一时的寡头、富商，如别列佐夫斯基、霍多尔科夫斯基、马云、任志强等。他们也曾积极涉政，但受体制所困，或因支持者失势，逐渐离开政坛，有的还锒铛入狱。但他们在缺乏自由度的环境下，冒着巨大政治风险也要参政，可见政治对商人的吸引力。印度、日本、墨西哥等国，也有不少商人深度涉入政治，成为影响国家政策的关键力量。

   富豪参政，有利也有弊。具体利弊几何，要看体制和环境、其背后力量及所代表势力，以及富豪个人的品性与价值观、自己的决定。富豪作为国家公民，参与政治是其权利，但同时也需受到法律和道德约束。富豪的收益既是其个人努力奋斗所得，也是社会发展和大众共同劳动创造。正如巴菲特所说，富豪取之与社会，也要回报社会。

  最重要的，富豪、其他有影响力和知名的人士，在参与政治时要明白，他们有着远超一般人的能力与影响力，也意味着有更大的责任与义务，要更多自省和自我约束，其言行应考虑复杂而重大的影响，尤其对于弱势群体的利害、对国内国际局势和平还是动荡的引导、对社会公正和均衡性的正负作用，而不能不顾这些、凭个人情感和狭隘利益肆意而为。否则，既严重伤害各国人民大众，也终会反噬自身。

In the 2024 U.S. presidential election, Donald Trump’s return to the White House was not only due to the support of his grassroots fan base and the Republican establishment but also because of the involvement and strong backing of billionaire Elon Musk. This business magnate, who dominates multiple industries such as aerospace, the internet, and automotive technology—and is also the world’s richest man—leveraged vast resources and platforms to rally support for Trump, helping him defeat Kamala Harris, who had once led in the polls, and reclaim the presidency.

Recently, Musk has fiercely criticized the ruling Labour government in the U.K., expressing dissatisfaction with its immigration policies and stance on crimes involving Muslim offenders, while encouraging white right-wing populists to oppose the government. Earlier, he also made controversial remarks on German politics, the Russia-Ukraine war, and other international issues, including supporting the far-right “Alternative for Germany” party, defending Putin’s invasion, and criticizing Ukraine. These actions indicate that Musk’s political interventions have extended beyond the United States, positioning him as a billionaire-politician who seeks to influence and even dominate global political trends. Notably, the Trump he supports is also a businessman and a U.S. billionaire.

Businesspeople and billionaires engaging in politics enjoy unique advantages. First, due to the nature of their wealth accumulation, they frequently interact with politicians, giving them a deeper understanding of political power, a higher participation frequency, and a greater ability to influence government affairs compared to ordinary citizens. Second, billionaires possess immense personal wealth, which can be converted into substantial political influence. Third, many billionaires achieve their status through exceptional business acumen and interpersonal skills, which provide a strong foundation for political engagement, making their transition into politics relatively seamless. Furthermore, beyond material wealth, many billionaires develop broader aspirations and idealistic goals, with politics serving as a crucial avenue for realizing those ambitions.

In the 20th century, numerous businesspeople and billionaires ventured into politics. Among them, the most politically and ideologically influential figure was George Soros.

Born in Hungary, educated in the U.K., and later immigrating to the U.S., Soros—a Jewish businessman who lived through Nazi rule, World War II, and the Cold War—developed a strong desire to engage in politics and change the world, likely due to his complex life experiences and multifaceted identity. After amassing vast wealth, Soros dedicated significant financial resources to supporting specific political groups in the U.S. and other countries.

In the U.S., Soros has been an outspoken supporter of the Democratic Party and progressive movements, playing a crucial role in Barack Obama’s presidential victories in 2008 and 2012, as well as backing Hillary Clinton in 2016. Internationally, he has actively supported opposition groups in authoritarian states, promoted liberal democracy, and championed the concept of an “open society.” In his birthplace, Budapest, he founded Central European University to train young leaders committed to freedom and progress. Additionally, Soros has strongly advocated for women’s rights, LGBTQ+ rights, environmental protection, and the rights of minorities and marginalized groups.

Soros’ activities have had significant impacts and achieved notable results, but they have also sparked major controversies. Right-wing figures in the U.S. and Europe criticize him as a manipulator of global politics and the mastermind behind the “deep state” that controls establishment politicians. Meanwhile, authoritarian regimes such as China and Russia accuse him of interfering in their domestic affairs.

Beyond Soros, other billionaires like Bill Gates and Warren Buffett have also actively engaged in public affairs, though their political involvement is relatively moderate and neutral.

Today, Musk, like Soros, is both a businessman and a billionaire who is passionate about politics, but their values and political stances are starkly opposed. Musk is a vocal supporter of the Republican Party and the right wing, often exhibiting a strong populist streak while opposing the Democratic Party and progressive movements. Internationally, he leans toward supporting Putin’s Russia and other authoritarian regimes, while aligning himself with the rise of right-wing populism in Europe. Hungarian Prime Minister Viktor Orbán—who has a longstanding rivalry with Soros—maintains close ties with Musk, with the two even dining together at Trump’s Mar-a-Lago estate. Musk also endorses Western white identity politics and a “native-first” ideology. Although both Musk and Soros claim to champion and defend “freedom,” their definitions, criteria, and target groups for this concept are fundamentally different.

Compared to Soros’ idealism, Musk prioritizes efficiency and profit, displaying a strong tendency toward social Darwinism. One could even argue that Musk sees efficiency and social Darwinism as ideals in themselves, seeking to influence government policies and civil society to instill these values in the broader public.

Unlike Soros—who, despite his radicalism, generally adheres to legal procedures and exercises caution in his public statements—Musk is more individualistic, unrestrained, and unpredictable. His acquisition of Twitter, rebranding it as “X,” and transformation of its content policies, his high-risk experiments with SpaceX’s Starship, and his provocative political statements in both U.S. and global affairs all reflect this bold and unconventional approach. Some of these actions have been lauded for their innovation and adventurous spirit, while others have sparked concern and unease.

Regardless of their differences, both Soros and Musk have profoundly influenced American and international politics, even playing the role of “kingmakers” in determining the leader of the world’s most powerful country. Musk’s deep involvement in shaping Trump’s presidential transition—such as his influence on H-1B visa policies, key personnel appointments, and even clashes with Trump’s grassroots supporters—has intensified concerns over the entanglement of business and politics. Even within Trump’s own circle, voices have emerged questioning Musk’s interference in government affairs. Ironically, Musk and other right-wing populists in the U.S. have frequently criticized Soros for manipulating American politics as a businessman, yet Musk himself now faces the same accusations.

In major powers such as Russia and China, there have also been high-profile oligarchs and business magnates—such as Boris Berezovsky, Mikhail Khodorkovsky, Jack Ma, and Ren Zhiqiang—who actively engaged in politics. However, due to systemic constraints or shifts in political power, many were forced out of the political arena, with some even imprisoned. Their willingness to take enormous risks to participate in politics despite operating in highly restrictive environments highlights the powerful allure of politics for business elites. Similarly, countries like India, Japan, and Mexico have seen numerous business figures deeply embedded in politics, significantly shaping national policies.

The involvement of billionaires in politics presents both advantages and drawbacks. The extent of these benefits and risks depends on the political system, social environment, the power structures backing them, and their personal character and values. As citizens, billionaires have the right to participate in politics, but they must also be subject to legal and ethical constraints. Their wealth, though a product of personal effort, is also built upon broader societal development and collective labor. As Warren Buffett once stated, billionaires, having gained from society, must also give back to society.

Most importantly, billionaires and other influential figures must recognize that their immense power comes with greater responsibility. Their political involvement must be tempered with self-awareness and self-restraint, taking into account the complex and far-reaching consequences of their actions—particularly their impact on vulnerable groups, the stability of domestic and international affairs, and the balance of social justice. Reckless and self-serving political intervention not only harms the general public but ultimately backfires on the billionaires themselves.

      

   11月8日，美国总统选举结果揭晓，共和党的特朗普击败民主党哈里斯，成为下一届美国总统。由于特朗普、万斯等共和党人在俄乌问题上拒绝支持乌克兰、亲近俄罗斯的立场，未来四年（甚至更久）乌克兰恐怕难以得到美国有力的军事和外交支持。而近日俄乌战争形势又利于俄罗斯一方，引发更大担忧。

   于是，乌克兰方面及其支持者，将目光转向了欧洲，寻求替代美国对抗俄罗斯的力量。尤其是英国、法国、德国等大国，被寄予厚望。

  那么，欧洲各国与俄罗斯关系如何？是否愿意又是否有能力替代美国对乌克兰的支援？欧洲如果支持乌克兰，是否可以抵挡住俄军进攻？

   需要首先说明的是，欧洲各国及各国内部的不同政治团体，在与俄罗斯关系及对俄乌问题的态度上，是存在较大差别的。而态度相似也不意味着政策及目的的相仿、实际投入的相近。因此需要具体分析。

   欧洲各国及各政治派别与俄罗斯的关系，可分为激烈反俄、较反俄、中立、较亲俄、高度亲俄这五类。具体对待俄罗斯的政策也颇有差别。

  其中激烈反俄的包括立陶宛、爱沙尼亚、拉脱维亚这“波罗的海三国”，以及波兰。“波罗的海三国”因为历史上与俄国/苏联的恩怨，非常敌视俄罗斯，也都加入了北约。这三国都与俄罗斯直接接壤，还靠近圣彼得堡等俄罗斯主要城市。

   但这激烈反俄的三国，都是“小国寡民”，虽都很重视军事，但并没有多少力量支持乌克兰。“波罗的海三国”更多侧重于防御，预备抵抗来自俄罗斯的侵略。虽然这三国给乌克兰提供了不少军事和经济援助，占GDP超过1%，但总量相当有限。这些国家虽反俄并援乌，但不愿也无力主动攻击俄罗斯或大规模派兵支持乌克兰。另外，丹麦也属于积极援助乌克兰抗俄的国家，2022-2024年，援乌开支高达GDP的1.9%，与爱沙尼亚并列第一。

   而既较强烈反俄又颇有国力的，只有波兰一国。波兰也是东欧最大经济体，军事力量不容小觑。波兰也是东欧为数很少有美国驻军的国家。波兰在历史上也与俄国发生多次战争，互有胜负。不过波兰在俄乌问题上的态度是复杂的。一方面，出于反俄需要和“唇亡齿寒”，波兰支持乌克兰反俄；另一方面，波兰与乌克兰历史上同样仇怨很深、相互种族屠杀，以及领土纠纷。这又让波兰从官方到民间并不愿意过多支持乌克兰。另外，波兰右翼政府虽然出于民族主义反俄，却又出于保守价值观而与俄罗斯有所共情。

   而较为反俄和中立的（这二者往往存在重合和波动），包括英、法、德、意、西等大国的建制派和多数群体，及瑞典、芬兰等俄北方邻国。巴尔干半岛中的克罗地亚、斯洛文尼亚等国也较为反俄。在俄乌战争之前，这些国家主流对俄罗斯持相对中立偏负面看法，俄罗斯全面入侵乌克兰，才让各国对俄观感恶化到类似以前冷战时代。

   但这些国家也都存在大量亲俄群体。各国的极左和极右、民粹反建制力量，出于价值观、利益、反建制等原因，与普京及俄罗斯方面较为亲近。如法国“国民联盟（前国民阵线）”、德国“另类选择党”、英国“脱欧党”等右翼和极右势力，及德国左翼党等极左势力，或出于价值观与俄罗斯保守主义相近，或基于不分正义邪恶的“和平主义”立场，均反对对乌克兰的军事援助，或批评俄罗斯入侵同时更批评北约和本国建制派政府。这些极右或极左势力日益成长，影响力不容小觑。各国建制派政府试图援助乌克兰对抗俄罗斯，也会受其掣肘。

   而较为亲俄的，包括匈牙利欧尔班政权等。塞尔维亚是巴尔干半岛最亲近俄罗斯的政权，但同时又与欧盟保持友好关系。罗马尼亚和保加利亚等国，虽更多是中立态度，或有时因为政府变更而亲西方，但由于处于东欧、与俄罗斯有各种经济文化联系，虽然对乌克兰有些声援，但并不愿意也无力参与制裁俄罗斯。

  而高度亲俄的被广泛承认的主权国家，只有一个，就是白俄罗斯卢卡申科政权。若算上不被广泛承认的国家和政治体，还包括德涅斯特河左岸共和国等被俄罗斯扶植的政权。

  根据以上划分，欧洲主要国家、大多数国家对俄罗斯是中立偏负面的态度。这些国家建制派/执政者及多数民意支持乌克兰、反对俄罗斯的入侵。但这种支持的力度是有限的，而不是激烈和坚定的。

   英国、法国、德国，是最具军事实力、在经济和外交上也颇有力量的三个欧洲国家。这三个国家的力量和态度，对欧洲是否可以取代美国、支持乌克兰对抗俄罗斯，至关重要。

   英法德三国虽是老牌列强，且至今仍然是世界综合国力前8位的强国，但其国力尤其军事势力无法与美国相比，也就意味着无法替代美国的援助能力。2023年北约各国军费开支比例，美国一国即占所有北约国家的68%，包括英法德在内全欧洲的开支仅占28%。在军事科技上，英法德虽也有尖端技术，却同样无力与美国比拟。

   虽然随着时间推移，欧洲列强及欧盟对乌克兰的援助逐渐增多，尤其人道援助超过了美国。如2023-2024年，欧盟各国对乌克兰的援助明显超过美国，2024年4月至6月，美国援助为（折合）84亿欧元，欧洲则有116亿援助。但经济援助不能替代军事武器和技术援助，这方面欧洲各国明显不及美国。而且据统计，2025年起乌克兰所获援助将大幅减少。

   而且，英法德三国也各怀鬼胎。英国长期在欧洲大陆推行“均势政策”，不愿欧洲大陆任何一国独大，也并不愿意看到法德更紧密联合。虽然英国有一定的反俄传统（包括沙俄时期和苏联时期），但又倾向以俄国制衡德国与法国。虽然如今似乎不再是帝国争霸时代，可英国仍然在其对欧陆的外交上实行“均势政策”，而不会过于偏帮其中一方。

    英国反对俄罗斯扩张，但并不热衷于对俄罗斯积极打击。英国脱欧后，有更多的回归孤立主义倾向，对乌克兰的支持必然是有限的。英国对乌克兰的支持，更多会是经济方面，而军事支持会很有限。只要俄罗斯没有对英国自身造成极大威胁，英国政府和民意都不会倾向直接出兵乌克兰。

  而法国则是有较深的亲俄传统，法俄两国几百年里都交往甚密。无论法俄两国左翼知识分子，还是传统贵族，都有不少渊源。法国也倾向于奉行与北约其他国家不同的独立自主外交和军事政策，长期并不追随美英等国对抗苏联/俄罗斯的政策。在普京全面入侵乌克兰之前，马克龙还一直希望保持与俄罗斯的友好关系。

   但同时，出于对普世人权、各国主权、国际法的重视和强调，法国又较为明确支持乌克兰反侵略。马克龙几个月前声称准备派法国军人前往乌克兰，是欧洲各国中第一个公开宣布有派兵计划的国家。

   但法国迄今没有实际派兵的行动。显然，法国方面说的与做的并不完全相符。这也和向乌克兰派兵可能导致大量人员伤亡引发国内反对、国内极左极右亲俄势力掣肘有关。虽然法国时常派兵干预非洲一些国家内政和人权，但俄罗斯军事力量远强于非洲那些贫弱国家，法国若派兵恐怕将付出巨大伤亡。

   德国是距离俄罗斯相对最近的欧洲大国，历史上与俄罗斯又颇有恩怨。俄乌战争爆发后，执政的朔尔茨政府一直倾向支持乌克兰，也是对乌克兰提供援助最多的欧洲国家。但随着战事的持续，德国对乌克兰的支持不增反减。由于德国本国财政和内政问题，今年对乌克兰的财政援助已较上年减半。

   德国建制派政府还较为支持乌克兰，而极左的左翼党和极右的德国另类选择党，都明确反对支持乌克兰，且有着较强的亲俄倾向。而随着极右的另类选择党在多次选举中支持率增加，德国民意更加倾向减少对乌援助。 

    而英法德三国，也都面临着国内复杂的经济社会问题，如财政入不敷出、移民融入和冲突等问题，没有足够资源和精力对乌克兰鼎力支持。相对于2022和2023年，2024年对乌克兰的支持还在减少。在这样的背景下，冀望他们填补美国援助的空白，恐怕是会大失所望的。

   而如果欧盟统合起来，共同对抗俄罗斯和支持乌克兰，又是否有可能及有胜算呢？同样是难以乐观的。如上所述，虽然欧洲主要国家及主流建制派，即欧盟的主导者和多数派，仍然是支持乌克兰反侵略的。欧洲主要国家和建制派不仅在立场和舆论上支持乌克兰，也实在付出了真金白银。俄罗斯入侵乌克兰两年多以来，欧盟给乌克兰提供了累计超过折合1300亿美元的各类援助，并在之后到2027年前再提供折合540亿美元援助。

但同时，也有不少国家及极左极右民粹派别，是亲俄和反对支持乌克兰的。欧盟内部存在严重的分歧。而又由于欧盟各组织往往采取“一致通过”方式决定事务，若有一票反对，往往就会搁置。而欧盟成员国匈牙利已在涉及俄乌问题上多次利用“一票否决权”阻挠欧盟的决策，另有一些国家也较为暧昧，让欧盟援助乌克兰的能力大打折扣。

  而欧盟各国都有强大的“欧洲（一体化）怀疑主义”力量，一直反对欧洲的统合及欧盟机构，甚至试图脱欧和解散欧盟。英国就已在2020年脱欧成功。在欧盟机构欧洲议会，就有庞大的反偶疑欧力量，利用欧盟平台本身反对欧盟。欧盟内部这样的形势，更不利于欧盟团结对抗域外势力。

   对于欧洲各国而言，他们虽然知道俄罗斯的巨大威胁、乌克兰沦亡后的“唇亡齿寒”，但并不愿意为乌克兰这个“他者”付出太大代价。特朗普当选总统后，瑞典、芬兰等国都开始进行民防动员，意在预备俄罗斯未来可能的入侵。但他们并未表达加大援助乌克兰的意愿。显然他们更倾向于自保，而非主动挑战俄罗斯。虽然欧盟官方一直声称坚定支持乌克兰，但口头与实际，以及具体能够支持多少，都是很有疑问的。

   而乌克兰自身，也面临着诸多严重问题。乌克兰本身就是一个较为贫困落后的国家，虽有较强工业基础，但与俄罗斯比仍然相形见绌。乌克兰的腐败问题也较严重，曾在国际上纵横捭阖的前外长库列巴就涉嫌腐败而被解职。乌克兰之所以能在此前两年抗击驻俄罗斯的攻击，主要就在于美国、欧洲列强、北约的军事支持。且即便得到大力支援，也只是勉强支撑，而并未战胜和驱逐俄军。若最大支持者美国停止军援，乌克兰就很难支撑了。

   至于乌克兰是否可以拖到四年后美国又一次大选，笔者认为恐怕是不能的。2022年至今乌克兰已尽全力，尚难以击败俄军，又如何有力量支撑四年。况且四年后美国可能仍然是孤立主义者、亲俄反乌者当权。而俄罗斯方面则不怕消耗，又有大量朝鲜军人做更廉价的“炮灰”，乌军无论打短期决战还是长期消耗战，都很难击败俄军。

   对于乌克兰试图研制核武器的可能，笔者也并不抱乐观态度。世界其他国家恐怕都不会支持乌克兰研制核武，乃至还要抑制其核战能力，以免战争陡然升级为核大战、殃及全欧和世界。若乌军没有足够投掷能力，也并不能威胁到俄罗斯。当然，乌克兰借研制核武器作为某种让普京愿意妥协的筹码，也是有一定价值的。但目前看，这并不能根本的改变俄乌局势。

  而欧洲各国更不愿意卷入核武冲突。欧洲各国之所以对援助乌克兰一直有保留，也是担心普京狗急跳墙、使用核武。但欧洲各国也不会完全被核讹诈吓倒，而是会选择既有原则（反对俄罗斯侵略）又相对谨慎（不过分刺激普京和俄罗斯）的策略。

   总之，笔者认为，乌克兰的前景是较为悲观的，欧洲各国无法取代美国的作用和援助。而加拿大等更远的北约国家，更难以提供及时有力的援助。虽然欧洲各国可能在短期加大援助，削弱美国停止援助的空缺，但恐怕难以持久。欧洲各国对乌克兰的援助不可能是足够需求量的、无限期的。

  欧洲各国尤其英法德，虽仍然可以通过外交手段，以乌克兰放弃克里米亚和乌东顿巴斯地区为条件，争取让乌克兰保有包括基辅在内的中西部领土。但俄罗斯贪得无厌、得陇望蜀，即便暂时接受协定，未来也可能趁隙再攻。乌克兰始终处在危险中。

  欧洲各国对于美国放弃支持乌克兰，以及减少在欧洲、在北约、在西方政治军事同盟中的存在和付出，是不乐见的。欧洲各国希望美国充分发挥其强大的国力尤其军事力量，护卫欧洲、西方、整个自由民主阵营，对抗穷凶极恶的俄罗斯及中俄朝伊等专制轴心势力。但起码在特朗普等孤立主义者执政期间，欧洲无法指望和挽留美国保护，只能寻求自主防卫，以及重新整合欧洲内部，建立没有美国也能对抗各方威胁的新同盟。

   美国若放弃支持乌克兰、纵容俄罗斯，也将大大改变欧洲各国的军事和外交。之前欧洲各国都尽可能压低军费，提倡和平主义，防卫较多依赖美国。若美国由孤立主义者执政，又面临俄罗斯巨大威胁，以及潜在的中国威胁，欧洲各国必然大幅提高军费开支、自主研发尖端武器。若美国领衔的北约不再具有足够职能，欧洲各国也可能另组军事联盟。这将是冷战后世界格局的又一次巨大变化。承平的欧洲不再，曾经的凭借实力争霸的丛林帝国时代，则可能卷土重来。

   但无论未来欧洲各国军事和外交如何变化，乌克兰恐怕无法得到及时、有力、充分的支持，起码需要付出一定的牺牲，才可能求得有限的和平与生存。乌克兰的悲剧，也是欧洲其他国家的教训和警钟。

최근 두 달 동안 윤석열 대통령의 미수에 그친 쿠데타 시도와 탄핵 사건을 둘러싸고 한국의 진보 진영(좌파)과 보수 진영(우파) 간에 치열한 공방전이 벌어졌다. 하지만 한국 정치에서의 격렬한 투쟁은 새로운 일이 아니라 오랜 전통이다. 1948년 대한민국 건국 이후 지금까지 13명의 대통령 중 대부분이 임기를 무사히 마치지 못했으며, 일부는 감옥에 갇히거나 암살당하기까지 했다. 이는 한국 정치의 잔혹성과 투쟁의 치열함을 단적으로 보여준다.

   수십 년 동안 한국 정치는 기본적으로 좌파 진보 진영과 우파 보수 진영이라는 두 개의 큰 진영으로 나뉘어 왔다. 양측의 적대감은 오래되었으며, 서로에 대한 깊은 증오가 존재한다. 수십 년 동안 쌓여온 두 진영 간의 갈등과 첨예한 대립이 오늘날 한국 정치의 극단적인 양극화, 불안정한 정국, 그리고 상대 진영을 철저히 제거하려는 무자비한 시도의 역사적 근원이다.

   이러한 역사적 적대감은 제2차 세계대전 이후 한반도의 분단, 남한 내전, 그리고 권력 투쟁까지 거슬러 올라간다. 1945년 일본이 항복한 후, 미국과 소련은 38선을 경계로 한반도를 각각 점령하였다. 북쪽에서는 소련이 지원한 김일성과 좌파 세력이 강제적인 토지 개혁, 지주 및 자본가의 자산 몰수 등 극좌 정책을 추진하면서 우파 세력을 폭력적으로 숙청하였고, 이 과정에서 많은 사람이 죽거나 남한으로 피신했다. 남쪽에서는 미국이 지원한 이승만 정권이 좌파 세력을 철저히 배척하며 정치권에서 축출했을 뿐만 아니라 보도연맹 학살, 제주 4·3 사건과 같은 대규모 학살을 저질러 수많은 민간인이 목숨을 잃었다.

   1950년 한국전쟁이 발발하면서 전선이 남북으로 여러 차례 오가며 좌파와 우파 모두 자신이 점령한 지역에서 상대 진영과 민간인을 대규모로 학살했다. 이로 인해 수백만 명이 목숨을 잃었으며, 양측의 증오는 더욱 깊어졌다. 한국 소설과 영화 태백산맥과 태극기 휘날리며 등은 이 비극을 강렬하게 묘사하고 있다. 전쟁 이후 북쪽에서는 김일성이 완전히 우파와 친남 세력, 심지어 노동당 내부의 반대 세력까지 숙청하여 북한은 야당과 반대 목소리가 없는 일당 독재 국가가 되었다.

   반면 남한에서는 이승만 정부와 이후의 여러 우파 정권이 독재적 통치를 유지하는 한편, 상당한 규모의 야당 세력과 정치적 반대 세력(좌파, 중도파, 일부 우파 포함)도 존재했다. 우파 성향이 뚜렷한 집권 세력과 달리, 남한의 야당 세력은 상대적으로 좌파 성향이 강했으며, 많은 인사가 1945~1955년 동안 우파 정권의 잔혹한 탄압과 학살을 직접 경험하거나 피해자와 깊은 연관이 있었다. 따라서 그들은 자연스럽게 우파를 강하게 증오했으며, 일부는 공개적으로 또는 은밀하게 북한에 동조하는 성향을 보이기도 했다.

   1989년 한국의 학생운동 지도자 임수경이 한국 법률의 제한을 무릅쓰고 북한을 방문한 후 귀국하여 수감되었음에도 후회하지 않았던 사례가 이러한 이념적 갈등을 보여주는 대표적인 예이다.

   이승만에서 박정희, 전두환에 이르기까지 한국의 집권 우파 세력은 오랫동안 ‘반공’을 명분으로 독재를 유지하면서 좌파 및 중도파 야당 민주 세력을 탄압했다. 이 과정에서 감금, 고문, 처형 등의 수단을 사용하며 강압적으로 억압했다. 예를 들어, 김대중은 여러 차례 사형을 선고받았다. 이러한 탄압은 좌파 민주 인사(지식인, 청년 학생, 노동자 포함)의 우파 정권에 대한 강한 증오심을 더욱 깊이 각인시켰으며, 이는 현재까지 이어지고 있다.

   1980년 광주 민주화 운동과 그에 대한 유혈 진압은 군부 독재 정권이 좌파 성향의 학생과 시민들을 탄압한 대표적인 사건이며, 한국 독재 정권 시대 정치 탄압의 상징적인 사례다.

   1987년 이후 한국은 점진적으로 민주화를 이루었으나, 역사적인 좌우 갈등과 적대감은 여전히 지속되었다. 양측은 단순한 정치적 대립을 넘어 깊은 원한과 완전히 상반된 가치관 및 정치적 성향을 가지고 있다.

   한국의 우파 보수 진영은 군대, 경찰, 엘리트, 재벌과 보수적인 농민 계층의 지지를 받으며, 저세율, 저복지, 효율 우선, 가족 가치, 경쟁적 개인 자유를 중시한다. 외교적으로는 친미·친일 성향이 강하며, 북한을 강력히 반대하고, 중국에 대해서는 경제적 협력은 하되 정치·군사적으로 경계하는 입장을 취한다. 또한 사회주의 및 공산주의 이념을 강하게 배척하고 혐오한다.

   한국의 좌파 진보 진영은 노동자의 권리, 여성 인권, 사회적 평등을 강조하며, 학생, 노동자, 여성, 지식인의 지지를 받는다. 고세율, 고복지, 평등 우선, 사회적 약자 보호를 주장하며, 외교적으로는 일본 우익과 군국주의 잔재를 강하게 비판하고, 미국과 우호적 관계를 유지하되 보수 진영만큼 밀착하지 않으며, 중국과 친밀한 관계를 맺고, 북한과의 화해를 지향하는 경향이 있다. 또한 사회주의 및 기타 좌파 이념에 대해 비교적 존중하거나 긍정적인 태도를 보인다.

   이처럼 정치적 이념의 극명한 차이와 역사적인 원한이 민주화 이후에도 한국 정치의 극단적인 양극화와 격렬한 투쟁을 초래했다. 오늘날 한국의 정치적 갈등은 과거 한국전쟁 시기나 독재 정권 시대처럼 유혈 사태로 번지지는 않지만, 민주화로 인해 정치적 표현이 더 자유로워지고, 정치 참여가 더욱 확대되면서 좌우 진영 간 갈등이 더욱 빈번하고 다양한 방식으로 표출되고 있다.

   물리적인 전쟁은 사라졌지만, 양측은 언론전, 사법전, 선거전, 인사 임명, 파업, 시위, 탄핵 등 다양한 방법으로 치열한 대결을 벌이며, 보이지 않는 전선을 형성하고 있다. 노무현의 수사와 사망, 박근혜·이명박·조국 등의 수감, 김대중·김영삼 가족의 부패 사건 등은 실제 범죄와 연관이 있지만, 동시에 정치적 투쟁과 상대 진영의 공격과도 밀접한 관련이 있다.

   최근 윤석열 대통령이 군사 쿠데타를 통해 야당을 탄압하려 했다는 의혹과, 이에 맞서 이재명 등 야당 지도자들이 집회를 열고 윤 대통령의 탄핵 및 체포를 추진하는 상황, 그리고 보수파와 진보파 지지자들이 대규모로 거리 시위를 벌이고 있는 현상 역시 한국 좌우 진영의 역사적 갈등이 계속되고 있음을 보여준다.

   한국 정치의 오랜 악순환이 지속되는 것은 국가 안정과 건강한 정치 발전에 도움이 되지 않는다. 오늘날 국제 정세가 점점 불안정해지고 있는 상황에서, 한국 내부의 인구 감소, 빈부 격차 확대, 젠더 및 계층 갈등, 국민 불안 증가 등의 문제를 해결하기 위해서라도 정치적 악습이 지속되어서는 안 된다.

      한국의 좌우 양대 진영과 중도파 인사들, 그리고 한국의 미래를 걱정하는 전 세계의 사람들은 한국 내 다양한 진영 간의 관계를 완화하고, 정치적 투쟁과 국력 소모를 점차 줄일 수 있는 방안을 모색해야 한다. 이를 통해 오랜 고난을 겪어온 한반도의 남북한 동포들과 눈부신 발전을 이루어낸 한국 국민들이 안정되고 번영하는 조화로운 사회에서 살아갈 수 있어야 한다.

   In the past two months, a fierce political battle has unfolded between South Korea’s progressive (left-wing) and conservative (right-wing) factions over President Yoon Suk-yeol’s alleged attempted coup and subsequent impeachment. However, political strife in South Korea is nothing new—it is a long-standing tradition. Of the 13 presidents since South Korea’s founding in 1948, most have not ended their terms peacefully, with some even being imprisoned or assassinated. This alone reflects the brutality and intensity of political struggles in the country.

   For decades, South Korean politics has been dominated by two major factions: the left-wing progressives and the right-wing conservatives. Their deep-seated animosity and mutual hatred have persisted for generations. The long-standing hostilities and sharply opposing positions of these two camps are the historical roots of today’s extreme political polarization, political instability, and ruthless attempts to eliminate the opposing side.

   These historical grievances can be traced back to the post-World War II division of the Korean Peninsula and the subsequent civil war and power struggles in the South. After Japan’s surrender in 1945, the United States and the Soviet Union divided the Korean Peninsula along the 38th parallel, with each side establishing its own administration. In the North, the Soviet-backed Kim Il-sung and his leftist forces implemented radical policies such as forced land reform and the confiscation of assets from landlords and capitalists. They also carried out violent purges against right-wing forces, resulting in many deaths and forcing others to flee to the South; in the South, the U.S.-backed Syngman Rhee regime aggressively suppressed leftist forces, not only excluding them from politics but also resorting to mass killings, as seen in the Bodo League Massacre and the Jeju 4.3 Incident, where large numbers of civilians were killed.

   When the Korean War broke out in 1950, the battle lines shifted multiple times between the North and South. Both left-wing and right-wing forces engaged in mass killings of their political enemies and civilians in their respective occupied territories, leading to millions of deaths and deepening mutual hatred. South Korean literature and films such as Taebaek Mountain Range and Tae Guk Gi: The Brotherhood of War have powerfully depicted these events. After the war, the North, under Kim Il-sung, completely purged right-wing, pro-South elements and even internal opposition within the Workers’ Party, turning North Korea into a one-party, one-man dictatorship without any opposition voices.

   Meanwhile, in South Korea, despite the authoritarian rule of Syngman Rhee and subsequent right-wing governments, a considerable opposition force, including leftists, centrists, and even right-wing opponents of the ruling regime, still existed. Compared to the staunchly right-wing ruling powers, the opposition in South Korea leaned more toward the left. Many opposition figures had deep connections to those persecuted by right-wing governments between 1945 and 1955. Naturally, they harbored strong resentment against the right-wing and, to some extent, held pro-North Korea sentiments.

   For example, in 1989, South Korean student leader Im Soo-kyung defied South Korean law to visit North Korea. Upon her return, she was sentenced to prison but showed no regret, reflecting the ideological divide.

   From Syngman Rhee to Park Chung-hee and Chun Doo-hwan, South Korea’s ruling right-wing forces long maintained authoritarian control under the banner of “anti-communism.” They brutally suppressed left-wing and centrist democratic opposition, using imprisonment, torture, and executions as political tools. Figures such as Kim Dae-jung were repeatedly imprisoned and sentenced to death. This repression only fueled the opposition’s hatred of the ruling right-wing forces, a sentiment that persists today.

   The 1980 Gwangju Democratization Movement and its brutal suppression exemplified the military regime’s violence against left-leaning students and civilians. This event became a symbol of South Korea’s authoritarian repression and left a lasting impact on the nation’s political consciousness.

   After democratization in 1987, South Korea transitioned to a more open political system. However, the historical resentment and ideological conflicts between the left and right remained. Not only do the two sides have deep-seated blood feuds, but they also hold fundamentally opposing values and political ideologies.

   South Korea’s right-wing conservatives represent the military, elites, and business conglomerates (chaebols) and also enjoy support from conservative rural communities. They advocate low taxes, low welfare, efficiency-first policies, family values, and a competitive individualism. In foreign affairs, they are pro-Japan, pro-U.S., strongly anti-North Korea, and view China with economic cooperation but political and military caution. They strongly reject socialist and communist ideologies.

   South Korea’s left-wing progressives focus on workers’ rights, feminism, and social equality, receiving support from students, laborers, women, and intellectuals. They advocate higher taxes, greater welfare, and prioritizing social equality and support for the disadvantaged. In foreign affairs, they harshly criticize Japan’s right-wing and militarist remnants, maintain friendly but cautious relations with the U.S., support closer ties with China, and seek reconciliation with North Korea. They also tend to respect or sympathize with socialist ideologies.

   The stark ideological divide and historical animosities have led to extreme political polarization and fierce struggles in democratic South Korea. While political conflicts today are not as bloody as they were during the Korean War or the authoritarian era, modern democracy has provided more avenues for political expression and participation, making left-right confrontations more frequent and diverse in their methods.

   Though physical violence has diminished, the battle has shifted to media wars, judicial battles, elections, personnel appointments, strikes, protests, and impeachment efforts. This has created an ongoing cycle of political infighting. Cases such as Roh Moo-hyun’s investigation and death, the imprisonment of Park Geun-hye, Lee Myung-bak, and Cho Kuk, and the corruption scandals involving Kim Dae-jung and Kim Young-sam’s families all involve actual crimes but are also deeply intertwined with political struggles and attacks from opposing factions.

   Now, President Yoon Suk-yeol’s alleged attempt to suppress the left-wing opposition through a military coup, the left-wing’s efforts to impeach and arrest him, and the mass protests by both conservative and progressive supporters all reflect the continuation of this historical struggle.

   For international observers shocked by the brutality of South Korean politics, understanding the historical context of the Korean Peninsula’s division and the deep-seated left-right animosities since 1945 helps explain the current situation. This also fosters greater understanding—particularly sympathy for the left-wing faction, which has endured severe repression throughout history.

   Additionally, flaws in South Korea’s political system—such as excessive presidential powers, a winner-takes-all electoral system, an overly powerful prosecution, and military-intelligence interference in politics—have all contributed to recurring political crises.

   While South Korea’s political battles are partly a reflection of democratic engagement, their ongoing intensity is ultimately detrimental to the country’s stability. Given today’s global uncertainties, South Korea also faces domestic crises such as population decline, widening wealth gaps, gender and class conflicts, and rising public anxiety. Under these circumstances, allowing political infighting to persist is unsustainable.

   South Korea’s left-wing and right-wing factions, centrists, and international stakeholders should seek ways to reduce political hostility, curb destructive infighting, and promote national unity. Only then can the Korean people—who have endured immense suffering but achieved remarkable success—live in a stable and prosperous society.

最近两个月，围绕韩国总统尹锡悦发动未遂政变及遭弹劾事件，韩国进步派（左翼）和保守派（右翼）展开了激烈的攻防战。而韩国政坛恶斗并非新事，而是由来已久的传统。1948年韩国建国至今的13位总统，大都不得善终，有几位还入狱和被杀，就能反映韩国政治的残酷和斗争的激烈。

   数十年来，韩国政坛基本分为左翼的进步派和右翼的保守派两大阵营。双方积怨很久、相互仇恨颇深。两大阵营鲜明对立的立场、双方数十年来的怨仇，正是今日韩国政治极化、政坛动荡不安、对立双方不择手段试图致对方于死地的历史根源。

  这些历史积怨，可追溯到二战后朝鲜半岛的分治、南部的内战与权力斗争。1945年日本投降后，美国和苏联以三八线为界，分别占领朝鲜半岛南北。在北方，苏联扶植的金日成及左翼势力，推行了强制土改、没收地主资本家资产等极左政策，并暴力清洗右翼，许多人被杀害和流亡南方；在南方，美国扶植的李承晚政权则竭力打击左翼，不仅排斥左翼进入政坛，还不惜大开杀戒，制造了“保导联盟屠杀”、“济州4.3事件”等惨案，同样有大批民众被杀。

  1950年朝鲜战争爆发，战线几度在南方和北方推移，左翼和右翼都在己方占领区大肆屠杀对方阵营成员及平民百姓，数百万人死亡，结下了更深的仇恨。韩国小说和电影《太白山脉》、《太极旗飘扬》等对此皆有震撼人心的描绘。战后，北方金日成势力彻底清洗了右翼、亲韩势力、劳动党内部，朝鲜成为一党一人独裁的国家，没有在野力量和不同声音。

  而在南方的韩国，一方面李承晚政府及之后各右翼政府实行专权统治，另一方面韩国仍然有颇为可观的在野势力、政治反对派（其中包括左翼、中间派、右翼）存在。相对于明显右倾的执政势力，韩国在野势力整体偏左，许多人还与1945-1955年期间遭受右翼政府残酷镇压、杀戮的人士有着深厚的渊源。他们自然较痛恨右翼，也明里暗里有亲北（朝鲜）情结。如1989年韩国学生领袖林秀卿不顾韩国法律限制，前往朝鲜访问，回国被判刑也不后悔。

   而从李承晚，到朴正熙、全斗焕，掌权的韩国右翼势力，长期以“防共”为名实行专制独裁、压制民主，对左翼及中间派在野民主力量长期高压打击，不惜使用监禁、酷刑、处决等方式镇压。如金大中等人就被多次判刑。这进一步激化了左右翼之间、在野与执政势力之间的矛盾。在野的左翼民主人士（包括知识分子、青年学生、工人等）对执政的右翼本就强烈的怨恨，也就一直延续了下去。1980年光州民主化运动和镇压，就是右翼军政府对左倾的学生和市民的暴行，也是韩国专制威权时代政治镇压的典型。

  1987年之后，韩国逐步实现了民主政治。而历史上左右翼的仇怨和对立却延续了下来。双方不仅有血海深仇，也在价值观、政治倾向上有着明显的对立。

   韩国右翼是保守派，较倾向军警、精英、财阀，也受较保守的农民阶层支持，主张低税收和低福利、效率优先、家庭价值、竞争式个人自由。外交上较为亲日、亲美，激烈反对朝鲜，对中国态度是经济合作、政治军事上防备。并强烈排斥、厌恶社会主义/共产主义意识形态。

  韩国左翼是进步派，较强调劳工权利、女权，受多数学生、工人、妇女、知识分子青睐。主张高税收高福利、平等优先、对弱势的扶助。外交上强烈批判日本右翼和军国残余、对美国虽友好但不如保守派亲密，对中国友好，与朝鲜颇为亲近。也较为赞同、尊重社会主义或其他左翼意识形态。

  政治立场上的鲜明对立，历史上深深的怨仇，都使得民主化后的韩国政治极化、斗争剧烈。虽然民主化后的韩国，政治冲突不像朝鲜战争前后及专制时代那样血腥，但民主化下公民政治表达更便捷、政治参与更广泛，左右两翼及其支持者之间冲突也更频繁，斗争方式更多样。

   没有了战场上刀枪的搏杀，但双方通过舆论、司法、选举、人事任命、罢工罢课和示威等方式展开激烈交锋，开辟了许多“不见血的战场”、“看不见的战线”。卢武铉的被查和死亡，朴槿惠、李明博、曹国等人的入狱，以及金大中和金泳三家人涉贪入狱，当事人确涉犯罪，但也都和政治斗争、敌对阵营的明枪暗箭有密切关联。双方都不愿给对方留下余地，而试图致政敌于死命，并恶性循环。

   而近日尹锡悦试图以军事政变镇压在国会占优、民意领先的左翼在野势力，而李在明等左翼在野人士集会对抗政变、推动罢免和逮捕尹锡悦，以及保守派集会强烈支持尹锡悦，双方支持者都数量众多、政治热情高涨，也是韩国左右两大阵营怨仇的延续和博弈的继续。

   惊讶于韩国政治斗争残酷性的各国观察者，若了解到1945年以来韩国及整个朝鲜半岛的历史背景、左右翼的血海深仇，就不会再感到惊讶，而会对双方都更加理解，尤其对左翼一方更多同情。

   而韩国政治体制的各种弊病，如总统权责过重和倾向“胜者全得”的选举制度、检察机关过大的侦调权、军情部门对政治的过度参与等，也是韩国经常发生政治危机和非常事态的重要原因。

   韩国长期的政治恶斗、左右对立，虽有这样那样的客观原因，很多时候也是民主与民意的体现，不应简单贬低和否定，但终究不利于韩国国家的安定和政治的健康。尤其在如今国际局势日益恶化、与各大国关系复杂而有挑战性、周边形势充满不确定性，韩国国内又面临人口萎缩、贫富差距大、性别和阶级矛盾突出、国民普遍焦虑等诸多危机背景下，更不宜让不良政治生态长期持续下去。

   韩国左右两大阵营、中间派人士，以及世界上其他关心韩国命运的人们，应该寻求促进韩国不同阵营缓和关系、逐渐停止政治恶斗和国家内耗的方法，让饱经苦难的朝鲜半岛南北同胞、创造辉煌的韩国人民，生活在安定繁荣的和谐状态中。

当今中国维权抗争的概况和特性（抗争内容、形式、目的、影响） 1

中国维权活动及维权者之间的“内卷化” 4

政治性抗争的必要性和重要性 5

外国与中国历史上政治性抗争的前例；抗争的组织和动员方式及其重要性 6

结语：中国的社会概况；结束维权“内卷”、组织起来政治抗争的必要与现实困境 7

   最近两年，由于中国经济的下行、习近平政权的各种倒行逆施、社会矛盾的激化、各地政府和官员的腐败和“不作为”/“乱作为”，中国民众时常遭遇权利和利益被侵害事件，人与人之间纠纷冲突的案例也大增。而因此导致的中国各地的维权抗争，也此起彼伏。

   当今中国维权抗争的概况和特性（抗争内容、形式、目的、影响）

    在推特、微博、今日头条、抖音等墙内外平台，都能看到许多维权抗争的信息。其中推特由于没有中共网络审查，爆出的维权事件尤其群体性的、对抗性的事件相对更多。其中一些知名推主，每天都会发布若干维权信息（来源主要是维权者自己或其他知情者投稿，以及这些推主自己搜集）。人们从中可以看到这些维权抗争的概况、共同点、特性。

   以8月下旬到9月初知名推主“李老师不是你老师”发布的涉维权信息为例（按发布时间为顺序）：

  8月27日，西安市临潼区教师被拖欠工资，在临潼区教育局门口维权；

   8月28日，中交四航局江门航通船业有限公司，拖欠工人数月工资，工人们罢工讨薪；

   8月27日，福建永泰嵩口镇。当地居民反映，17年当地为了修建高速公路拆迁，但直到今天都没有解决安置问题，而临时过渡的房子已成危房无法居住。村民举牌维权；

  8月27日-29日，河南固始县。储户发视频称，他们的钱存在固始县农业银行现无法取出。“银行把老百姓存的钱拿去给人家盖房子，房地产公司倒闭了，老百姓的钱一分都没了，银行不认账，打官司也打不赢”。村民聚集维权；

  9月1日，广州钟落潭镇居民因担心辐射，抗议在村子附近修建广州高能技术科技园

……

  而另一专门爆料中国维权事件的推特博主“昨天”，近期也发布了若干维权抗争信息：

「甘肃白银：政府零赔偿强征，出警镇压反抗村民（8月23日）」甘肃白银平川区黄桥乡牛拜村，当地政府零赔偿强征土地，于周五出动上百警察以及打手镇压抗议村民。

「上海奉贤：海银财富投资人再次维权再遭镇压（8月29日）」周四，上海奉贤区，海银财富的投资人再一次发起维权行动，要求公安局立案，但再次遭到警察镇压。这是自去年12月海银暴雷以来，投资者发起的最新一轮维权行动。；

「陕西咸阳：两烂尾楼盘业主联合堵路维权（8月26日）」周一，陕西咸阳，烂尾楼绿地新都会和融创御河宸院的业主联合维权，堵了咸阳房地产交易中心门口的交通；

「广东肇庆：建筑工人堵门讨薪与警察对峙（8月29日）」周四，广东肇庆端州区，中南高科双龙科创产业谷的建筑工人为了拿到工资，堵了大门并与警察对峙。据一名工人透露，周五，他们已经拿到了70%的工资；

「浙江温州：国企大幅降薪200工程车司机连日罢工（8月29至30日）」浙江温州交运集团的200名工程车驾驶员周四、周五连续两天罢工，抗议公司大幅度降薪。据罢工司机透露，他们原来的保底工资是每月8000，降薪之后只有每月2500.

「湖南衡阳：业主堵路抗议开发商卷走水电费（8月30日）」湖南衡阳福龙湾，开发商卷走业主缴纳的水电费后导致小区停水停电，维权业主周五堵了小区门口的公路：

「湖南衡阳：村民抵制核废料项目遭警察镇压（8月30日）」周五，湖南衡阳衡东县大浦镇太平村，抵制核废料项目建设的村民遭到警察的镇压，多人被殴打及抓捕。

「广东深圳：极兔快递工人连日罢工讨要工资（8月31至9月1日）」广东深圳光明新区极兔快递拖欠工资，员工连续两天罢工，用货车堵住分拣仓大门，阻止公司继续取件；

……

  根据以上两个推特主这些天的若干爆料信息，可以看出，各种维权抗争主要集中在工人或教师讨薪、国企员工要求保障待遇、小区业主抗议烂尾楼、“P2P”投资者在企业暴雷后讨要投资款、拆迁户安置和赔偿、强征土地、反对排污伤害家园等。而其他日期、其他推主/博主维权爆料的情况，也大同小异。

   简而言之，以上事件基本都是公民因为个人的直接利益受损，若干相同单位/小区/村镇有相同遭遇的人，为维护个人利益或小群体成员们的利益，而进行的抗争。而这些维权者目的，也都是直接且现实的，例如发放薪水、保障工资和福利待遇、将烂尾楼竣工交付、赔偿投资损失、拆迁安置补偿、禁止排污保护他们健康等。

   其中为了小群体维权的抗争者，最终也还是为了自己。参与者基本都是自身（或起码其亲属）也是利益受损者。如果自身没有受害，即便其所在的某个群体（如单位、村庄）其他成员受害，这些没有受害的成员往往也并不参与同事/同乡们的抗争。

  而维权抗争的小群体，规模往往在数人至数百人不等，基本都是同一个单位/小区/村庄/受害圈子的成员，抗议范围一般局限于工作单位、居住地、事发地，有时会前往当地政府或相关负责机构抗议。其中绝大多数（90%以上）规模都不超过100人，也基本不会在涉事地点和政府机构附近之外的地方进行抗议活动。

  除了这些群体性抗争，还有更多个人的维权、举报、上访，原因更加多样，除和以上集体抗争类似的原因，还有遭遇冤假错案、要求工伤赔偿、反映被诈骗、政府乱收费等，以及控诉政府和公检法对侵害各种权利问题不作为、乱作为、包庇犯罪等。这些个人维权同样是因为个人权利受损、要求补偿损害。

  个人和小群体维权抗争的缺陷和局限、政治性抗争的缺失

  而以上这些或集体或个人的维权抗争，都基本没有政治目的、没有意识形态主张和口号，也没有提出代表更加广泛人群的、普惠性的、长久性的诉求。换句话说，他们都没有触及大多数问题的根本，即如今的政治体制和分配制度，也没有将矛头对准统治中国、决定政策方针和社会状况的中国共产党统治集团。

   即便一些人提出惩罚某些官员和公务员的诉求，也都只是针对侵害自身权利的个别人员，而并无对政府和执政团队整体的批判。虽然不少人也知道官官相护和体制问题，但很少以正式方式提出否定政权合法性的抗议。相反，在许多维权活动中，还时常有“请共产党做主”、“求习近平/xxx官员做主”之类的标语口号。

   其中形成维权小团体的，也只是简单的出于共同利益的短暂合作，而没有固定和长期的结社。尤其是工厂工人、外卖员、P2P受害者等相对陌生人组成的维权队伍，更是临时性的，得到补偿或被镇压后就解散的。有些维权团体没有被镇压或实现诉求，但成员没有心力继续，本就松散的维权团体就自动解散或“僵尸化”。

  另外，许多不同个人或集体的维权活动之间，乃至同一抗议集体的内部，还存在利益的对立和现实的冲突。一些维权者还会提出无益于甚至有害于大众普遍利益的要求。

   例如一些国企、事业单位的职工，不仅要求足额发放工资，还要求落实各种政策优待，保障其远超普通民众、农民、非国企工人的收入和福利待遇；

  一些前官员、干部、防疫“大白”，也上访维权、举牌举报，讲自己对党和政府的“功劳”，希望获得应有“待遇”；

   一些小区业主，听闻自己所购同期房屋价格下降、新购房者购房价更低后，在小区和售楼处乃至政府部门抗议，要求开发商“不要降价”或“退还差价”；

  一些居民反对在自己住宅较近地区建设变电站、电信基站、核电站、火葬场、垃圾填埋场、临终关怀中心，哪怕一些设施没有实际危害，还有一些则是必然需要建设；

  ……

   这些人的维权要求，是损人利己的、以损害无辜者或更加弱势者利益为代价的。例如一些国企“工人贵族”和干部，劳动价值不抵收入，其获得的收入，需要从全体纳税人那里支取；他们得到的“待遇”，往往是凌驾于平民百姓之上、远比非国企工人和农民优厚的；他们所“维”的“权”，往往不是正当权益，甚至是特权。有些人，则是在反智思维和邻避心理下追求排他性的目的、逃避公共责任。

   而那些未损害他人利益和未追求特权的维权活动，其出发点和落脚点也都是为了个人/小群体的利益，通过各种方式向政府施压，以满足其特定的少数人的诉求。而这也意味着，其他同样处在体制性不公不义环境中的大多数人，并不能从其维权中获利。

   进一步说，由于中共政权惯常以“拆东墙补西墙”、动用公共资源来“维稳”和平息事态，这些个人和小集体维权者的活跃，在部分达成维护自身利益目的时，客观上还让更多相对更为弱势、沉默无声、种种原因无力维权的人受损更多，以自身的“失”承担了维权者“得”的代价。而且中共维稳不惜代价，无论对上访者/维权者是压制还是安抚，包括处理纠纷过程中的人员和经费使用，都会花费巨量金钱、人力物力，代价当然也是全体纳税人埋单。而一些官员、打手，反而可以从对上访者/维权者的镇压中获得利益，包括“维稳经费”和官职升迁。

   而不同身份的维权者之间、相同身份和维权原因的不同个体之间，往往也会争夺舆论的关注、第三方的声援，相互形成竞争关系，试图最大限度获取本已受限的关注度和支持。虽然有时不同维权者也会形成某种联动和呼应，但显然也存在冲突，整体上是不利于维权者得到关注和帮助的。

   那些缺乏发声技巧、其事件没有特别亮点的个人维权者或小群体，他们的苦难和诉求，往往被更吸引眼球的维权者/小群体及热点事件的舆论声浪掩盖了。这些被忽视的维权者，也恰恰占了大多数。他们的抗争往往因为缺乏关注而失败，既是因为那些成功的抗争者的抗争成果不能惠及他们，还在于那些得到关注的抗争者客观上挤占了舆论焦点和各方支援。

   笔者当然也知道，之所以中国民众普遍只为个人私利维权，而回避对根本体制的批评和变革要求，也是中共政权有意诱导所致。中共政权一方面对批判政权、直接涉及政治的反抗严防死守，一方面又对个人因私利维权而网开一面，就是故意一“堵”一“疏”，诱导人们放弃改变体制、推翻政权的尝试，而只顾个人私利，以便于政权各个击破。而且个人维权的要求往往也较低、较易满足，也不会对统治集团的统治造成冲击，政权也就不害怕，有时也愿意部分满足人们个人诉求。

  而笔者对于个人维权者自私自利的批判，主要是针对那些干部、工人贵族、体制内各种要求保障特权的人，而非弱势的大众。而对于弱势大众维权中自私也有批评，但主要是为反映个人维权的局限、缺乏政治性抗争的表现、呼吁人们结成更加团结的政团、进行政治目的的抗争的必要性。

  但无论如何，个人或小群体为个人私利进行的维权抗争，显然都是颇有局限的、不宜高估的、应当寻求更加有效和普惠性抗争方式的。

 中国维权活动及维权者之间的“内卷化”

   对于这些个人维权及其作用和影响做简单概括，可以称为维权的“内卷化”。

   “内卷”是近年中国流行的词汇，指就是人们获取利益、争夺固定量的资源，投入巨大精力与他人同质化竞争，且竞争门槛和成功要求水涨船高，而竞争过程并不能益于其个人和社会，空耗人们的精力、增加压力和痛苦，反过来损害人们的生活质量、阻碍社会真正的进步。

    而根据“内卷”的定义和特点，维权抗争显然同样在“内卷化”。

    虽然，相对于默默无闻、逆来顺受、接受被剥削压迫的代价，人们敢于说出来不公和提出诉求，甚至上街举牌、前往政府请愿/抗议，是前进了一大步，是值得称赞的。这反映了人们的权利意识和维护权利的意愿，以及可贵的行动力。这也可以施压政府，让其看到人民的诉求、做出必要的改变。

   但当各路维权者都只为自己发声、只为狭隘的小群体说话，也并不要求进行根本性的、体制性的变革，只是要求获得自己个体的、眼前的利益，并不顾及社会中其他人的合法权利和关切，乃至愿意让执政者从他人和公共资源中挖出一些满足自身需求，部分维权者还在自身需求被满足、获得利益后又站到政府一方、对其他受害民众加以漠视、嘲讽、批判，这样的维权显然就“变味”了。即便客气些批评，这样的维权也是非常有局限性的、无法让大多数人的处境得以改善的。

  如果不能改变根本制度和分配不公，弱者处在缺乏保障、贫穷虚弱状态，就必然时常遭遇权利被侵犯，尊严被践踏、剩余资源也被明抢暗偷的情况。而在物质匮乏和时常遭受伤害情况下，弱势老百姓不仅会被上层欺凌，中下层民众之间的竞争也会更加激烈、冲突更多，各种纠纷此起彼伏。这些老百姓就会陷入贫困和暴力的恶性循环，在各种迫害和纠纷中越陷越深，无论物质利益还是精神心理，都遭受重创，人生被毁掉。

  即使对于这些个人维权者自身，其只追求个体利益，也是不易实现的、难以维护长远利益、还容易被“秋后算账”的。对于统治者，这些分散的维权者当然相对“好对付”。即便组成维权小团体，无论其成员所属还是利益诉求，都局限在特定而狭小的范围，而没有足够公共性，且内部往往也是没有纲领和团结性，很容易被分化和各个击破。

 例如一些“烂尾楼”受害业主，并不能和其他“烂尾楼”受害者长久团结，一旦政府和开发商对部分业主拉拢，同意退房款或尽快施工交楼，这些人就不再顾及其他没有得到退款和交楼的“烂尾楼”受害者，而p2p集资诈骗事件受害者，同样在得到退款/赔偿的就会退出维权，不顾其他受害者。而政府可以通过根据维权者情况，分化瓦解、各个击破，只满足抗争能力较强的维权者，而相对更弱势的维权者得不到支持，就只能放弃维权，不放弃也难以有以前的声势和影响、难以维权成功（往往最后也都不了了之）。政府就“维稳”成功了。

   而这些人即便在短期维权成功，也并不意味着再也没有了侵害。在不公不义、缺乏民主法治的环境中，被侵权是常事。而每次被侵害权利都维权抗争，代价是很大的，且几乎不可能每次维权都成功。尤其涉及公权力和权贵的不法行为，维权成功率很低。

  而维权后被打击报复，也是常态。许多维权者当时依靠证据、舆论、人多势众，暂时维权成功。但往往会在舆论淡忘、维权组织解散后，被各种“秋后算账”、“穿小鞋”。而这种可能性，本身就吓阻了很多潜在的维权者。即便一些人勇敢的抗争了，之后也是无尽的麻烦和充满不确定性的危险。例如在胡锦涛时代为被拐卖卖淫的女儿伸张正义、2013年在法院胜诉的唐慧女士，就在2023年被地方政府和公检法报复，被逮捕判刑。唐慧还是广受关注且其抗争颇有公共性的人物，都被如此报复，可想而知那些被忽视的抗争者被“秋后算账”的危险和悲剧。

  这些都是个人为了个体利益维权的局限和弊端，很多弊端都可以视为维权“内卷化”的表现。与近年来国人在劳动、学习、考试等方面恶性竞争、零和博弈的情况类似，个人或小团体的维权，客观上演变为较弱势民众之间的利益争夺，上层统治者坐收渔利。这些个人维权也并未改变体制和社会环境，整体人权状况的恶劣和分配不公都没有改善。

   （即便是全国性的维权抗争，如果仅仅止步于维护个人直接现实的利益，也难以长久。例如2022年底的“白纸运动”，虽然有一定政治成分，更是全国开花，但仍然是以解除疫情封控为主要目的。当中共放弃清零政策，抗争也就基本停止。这样的运动并没有改变中国现实。同样，像解放军老兵维权等，同样颇有规模却止步于个人及特定身份者直接利益诉求，而不能改变中国体制和现实。这些抗争运动后，包括这些参与者在内的中国人民，仍然会持久遭受专制荼毒，抗争者还会被打击报复）

   政治性抗争的必要性和重要性

   所以，基于个人利益的维权抗争，固然值得称赞，但其弊端也颇多，有着明显局限性。那么，如何才能革除维权的弊端、打破局限性呢？

   笔者认为，只有人们不再只为个人利益、局部和短期利益、具体物质利益而抗争，而是愿意关心和参与更具政治性的、抽象与意识形态层次的、触动乃至改变根本体制和分配制度的反抗行动，才可能实现广泛而长久的、既宏观和根本又能惠及每个公民的有益变革与收益。

   中国社会的各种微观问题，无论是欠薪、烂尾楼、执法不公、环境污染、就业难、看病贵、教育内卷、养老保障差劣……以及这些问题得不到解决/缓解，甚至愈演愈烈，都在于这个国家的权力并非真正归人民所有，决定国家方向和各项政策的当权者与人民割裂和对立；

   而国家资源和财富及分配权，同样被权贵垄断，人民只有劳动权而无保障所得的能力。当人们只能争夺权贵漏下的残渣求存，就必然面临物质贫乏和生存困境，生存压力巨大、时常受欺凌的无尊严生活状态下，中下层民众之间也会更为激烈的争夺利益，各种纠纷层出不穷，欠薪、诈骗、各种刑事犯罪多发也就不奇怪；

  中共政权在意识形态、舆论、新闻媒体领域的垄断，也控制了话语权，对人民进行洗脑、操控社会舆论，对民间不同声音进行灭杀。这让人们即便有不满和异见，也无法表达。而许多被洗脑的民众，也缺乏对中共专制邪恶的认识，对于遭受体制伤害的人缺乏理解和同情……

  总之，中国各种问题，根本都是政治问题（也可以说是权力所属问题），以及政治问题衍生的利益分配问题。如果国人不去针对根本问题进行反抗，而只是在具体事情上维权，必然是治标不治本的。即便得到一些妥协和让利，也是“捡了芝麻丢了西瓜”，无法弥补作为公民在权利、物质、尊严、话语权等方面各种直接间接、有形无形的损失。

  外国与中国历史上政治性抗争的前例；抗争的组织和动员方式及其重要性

   而纵观世界各国的公民抗争与人权进步历史，没有哪个国家的公民一直以回避政治来维护权利，更无法纯粹依靠个体或小群体维权实现社会变革。各国的民主化、平权措施、社会保障制度，都是在经历政治性的公民抗争和根本的体制改革后，才逐渐实现的。例如掀开欧洲民主化的法国大革命、英国宪章运动，都是以争取公民普选权、废除贵族特权、八小时工作制等广泛民权为目标。

   即便各国有一些抗争的起点和直接目的，是基于个体事件，往往也会引向普惠性的目的。例如美国黑人民权运动，就是通过个体对种族歧视的诉讼，争取全体黑人的权利，而并非只是满足那一个黑人的要求。而欧美的工人运动，也是为整个行业乃至全部工人阶级谋取权利和福利，而非只是为个人的加薪。

    而无论自由主义/民主主义、宗教保守主义/教派主义、民族主义/本土主义、社会主义/共产主义，这些看似抽象的意识形态，也都是人们争取权利、凝聚人心、达成抗争目的的手段。因为只有通过对抽象的意识形态的认同，才能超越自私和短视的局限，形成广泛的人际网络和联合，团结起来去争取政治权力，达成参与者的物质与非物质诉求。

    在抗争过程中，形成身份认同和组织、有一致的目标和分工，是非常重要的。例如韩国人民反抗军政府专制、推动民主化过程中，工人组成的工会、基督徒组成的基督教会、学生组成的学生团体，发挥了非常重要的作用。参与者们也都有超越个人利益的信仰和目标，成员分工合作，并且有人愿意付出坐牢、被酷刑乃至生命代价，其他人也会在其被捕或死亡后继续抗争。这才成就了韩国民主化的胜利，和民主化后一系列的人权改善。

   而新疆维族、西藏藏人、香港人、台湾人，其之所以能够长期的反抗并颇有影响力，也在于他们基于对自己民族/城邦/地域/宗教信仰的强烈认同和自豪感，形成了共同体，有着共同的族群情感、共同的历史记忆、共同的现实利益，以带有民族主义/本土主义/教派主义倾向的抗争运动，有效团结了相当一部分同族同胞、共同对外，且在信仰和责任感激励下，人们愿意为共同体的其他成员付出代价，相互扶助和支援，乃至出生入死。虽然他们并不总是成功，还会作为整体受到更多打压，但即便失败也能产生巨大影响力。而中国大陆汉族人之所以无法像港台疆藏那样的影响力，也正是在于缺乏这样的族群认同和凝聚力，一盘散沙下就无法反抗“利维坦”。

   而中共自身的崛起，同样依靠的是通过阶级动员，号召工人、贫农、各种弱势和边缘人，参加共产党和军队，逐渐发展壮大，取得革命成功。当然中共当权后背叛了理想和承诺，但这不影响对其早年发动大众成功能事实，以及他者学习其成功经验。而一度统治中国的国民党及其前身同盟会，同样是广泛发动大众，依靠基于民族和阶级的动员，取得反清革命、国家统一、击败日本侵略的成就。

   以上这些案例和历史经验，都反映了人们超越个人私利、广泛团结、为宏观的和利于大众的政治目标而抗争，才能真正实现社会变革，并最终利于族群内每个具体成员的利益。在这个过程中，人们也需要将个人私利搁置，更多为公共利益和根本变革而奋斗牺牲。

  结语：中国的社会概况；结束维权“内卷”、组织起来政治抗争的必要与现实困境

  对于中国大陆人，尤其因缺乏身份认同和信仰（无论是宗教信仰，还是其他信仰、信念、理想）、原子化和散沙化的汉族人，无论选择自由主义、民主主义，还是基于阶级、民族、宗教、地域，总之都需要有超越个人私利的信仰和目标，愿意为他者着想和付出，团结抗争，部分人在必要时甚至愿意付出坐牢甚至死亡的代价，才能改变如今一盘散沙甚至内讧的状态，共同反抗专制强权和特权集团，实现民主，之后才可能从根本上解决如今社会里的各种不公不义。

  当然，在如今中国的社会环境下，中国人想要实现团结和组织起来，为宏大的政治目标而斗争，是不易实现的。中共政权必然是严防死守、千方百计破坏的。而国人经过几十年迫害和洗脑，也普遍犬儒化、社会达尔文化、精致利己，更在乎私人的物质利益，没有政治热情和远大理想，穷人忙于挣钱，富人热衷享乐，都缺乏为公共利益奋斗的意愿和能力。显然，政治体制和大环境不利于大规模的政治抗争（但这也恰反映了抗争的必要重要），连萌芽都会被扼杀。

   即便真的人们普遍觉醒、明白团结和组织性的重要，大数据极权下统治者触角的无孔不入，散沙化的社会、缺乏公民素养和政治参与能力的人们具体如何形成有效的连结，在具体路径和细节上也困难重重。

  但即便困难，有识之士也应该早做筹谋，沟通和动员大众，尤其让那些个人维权者明白改变根本体制才能维护个人权利的道理，让他们将保卫私人利益的热情和实践，转化为既为私又为公的抗争与行动力。

   具体如何做，是又一个宏大的课题，在本文不再展开详细讨论。不过，上面提到的港台疆藏人的身份认同和组织性、韩国民主化的路径和民众团结方式、中国国共两党的成功经验（也有失败教训），都是颇为值得中国大陆汉族人借鉴的。而从18-19世纪欧洲政治革命，到苏东剧变和“第三波民主化”，乃至十几年前的“阿拉伯之春”，其中也有许多经验可以借鉴，同样又有不少教训值得汲取。对于中国人，塑造身份认同、形成坚定信仰、构建共同体，并培养公共意识、拥有常识和判断力、有着现实行动力和掌握斗争技巧，是团结抗争、促成根本变革的前提和关键。

  笔者强调为公共利益抗争、政治性反抗的重要，也并不抹杀个人维权的必要性和价值。正如前文所说，个人维权体现了人的权利意识，揭露了社会阴暗面和政府的滥权或失职，也能对政府造成一些压力，可能促成政府改善施政。另外，个人维权还能让许多人在维权过程中，自觉的明白政权的邪恶和推翻专制的必要。他们在权利被侵害和维权中遭遇的两重苦难、维权中各种经验教训，也让他们成为潜在且有力的政权颠覆者。如果自由派精英、民主运动人士，能够对这些维权者善加引导，就能让数量庞大的、以往不关心政治的人，成为打碎“利维坦”枷锁的巨大力量。

  但为个人利益抗争终归是有局限的，这种抗争本身是不能推翻专制的。例如中共建政以来，尤其改革开放之后，中国的上访者一直都很庞大，北京各机关尤其信访部门，几十年来没有中断过上访者。但显然并没有撼动中共体制。相反，很多老百姓的精力和钱财被消耗在上访的过程中，信访和个人维权也成了中共给老百姓制造“虚假希望”的画饼。这也更加反映了国人需要觉醒、通过政治反抗改变中国的必要性。

 总之，中国此起彼伏的个人维权，有其重要的价值，但也很有局限。个人维权的“内卷化”，不利于中国全民整体和每个个体平均得到的权利改善。针对具体利益的抗争也“治标不治本”，政府的有限退让也是“换汤不换药”。只有人们普遍性的团结、为公共利益进行政治性的抗争，建立一个民主法治、各项自由得到保障的新国家、新体制、新社会，中国的各种不公不义才能逐渐消除，每个国民才能有尊严的、免于匮乏、免于恐惧的生活。

                                                        王庆民

                                                 2024年9月5日

                                             共和历232年菓月菊日

  （本文已发表于《议报》，图源财新网和KSD韩星网）

Recently, I watched the documentary The General’s Guard, which depicts the post-war experiences and later-life struggles of Tang Menglong, a Nationalist hero of the War of Resistance Against Japan (1937-1945). After watching this film, I felt compelled to share some thoughts on the history and realities it reflects.

The documentary’s protagonist, Tang Menglong, once served as the bodyguard of Nationalist General Song Xilian. In 1937, after the Marco Polo Bridge Incident, Tang joined the Nationalist army to resist the Japanese invasion and defend his homeland. Alongside General Song and other comrades, Tang endured the brutal war from 1937 to 1945, even sustaining injuries in the line of duty. Through their sacrifice of blood and flesh, they safeguarded the nation and its people. After the war, Tang accompanied Song Xilian to Xinjiang. Like the millions of Nationalist soldiers, Tang Menglong was a celebrated hero of the victorious Allied forces, earning respect from the Chinese people and the global anti-fascist community. A bright future seemed to await him.

However, the outbreak of the Chinese Civil War shattered those expectations. Within just four years, the Chinese Communist forces defeated the Nationalists, and Song Xilian was captured in southwestern China. As for Tang Menglong, who had been demobilized and returned to his hometown, he, along with his wife and children, endured decades of political persecution under the Communist regime, especially during the harrowing years of the Cultural Revolution. This grim reality was something unimaginable even for Nationalist soldiers who had either surrendered or retired to civilian life.

The “New China” that emerged under Communist rule refused to acknowledge these anti-Japanese heroes. On the contrary, Nationalist soldiers—members of the “National Revolutionary Army,” also called the “Kuomintang Army” depending on one’s political perspective—were vilified as part of the “reactionary Kuomintang.” Regardless of their wartime contributions, they were deemed enemies. During Mao Zedong’s era, the prevailing narrative focused on class struggle and opposing Nationalist rule; contributions to the anti-Japanese war were downplayed or dismissed entirely. (During this period, the regime didn’t commemorate the War of Resistance or events like the Nanjing Massacre and even supported Japan’s anti-American stance.) Simply being affiliated with the Nationalist government or military was considered an unforgivable crime—even though Mao himself had once held a senior position in the Kuomintang during the First United Front.

During the “Campaign to Suppress Counterrevolutionaries” in the early 1950s, many heroes of the Xinhai Revolution and the War of Resistance were executed by the Communist regime. Others were sent to impoverished and remote regions for “labor reform.” In the Anti-Rightist Movement, numerous intellectuals who had participated in the resistance were denounced and exiled. During the Great Famine, many Nationalist soldiers and intellectuals who had survived the horrors of the Japanese invasion perished from starvation in labor camps. Later, during the “Four Cleanups Movement,” even Communist members with past Nationalist affiliations were scrutinized and persecuted. These political campaigns and disasters destroyed the lives, careers, and even the very existence of countless heroes of the resistance.

Tang Menglong was one of the few who narrowly escaped death during these tumultuous times. But an even greater ordeal awaited him during the Cultural Revolution, which the Communist Party itself has since acknowledged as a “catastrophe.” During this decade of chaos, Tang and his family were repeatedly humiliated and beaten by Red Guards. Their neighbors, who had joined the Red Guards, not only harassed and oppressed him but even attempted to kill him. Tang survived by fleeing to the mountains, where he hid while his family secretly brought him food. Even in their later years, Tang and his wife remained haunted by these experiences, still fearful of their former Red Guard neighbors.

Tang Menglong’s wife was a Communist Party member, a textbook example of a “progressive youth” during her early years. She had once disregarded her family’s interests to provide food and money to the struggling Communist forces. However, even her sacrifices did not spare her from the Cultural Revolution’s fanatical Red Guards. She was persecuted to the point of lifelong disability and had to rely on a cane for the rest of her life. Her tragic fate mirrored that of many Communist officials, from high-ranking figures like Liu Shaoqi and Deng Xiaoping to countless grassroots Party members. The plight of Tang Menglong and his wife serves as a microcosm of what both former Nationalists and Communists endured during Mao’s era—a testimony to the survivors.

During Mao Zedong’s roughly 30-year rule, Nationalist soldiers who fought in the War of Resistance Against Japan lived through a hellish existence. Many had already died, and those who survived suffered relentless humiliation, as if, to borrow a phrase, they were “enslaved by the hands of others, slaughtered alongside cattle and horses.” Their dignity was stripped away, and their physical and mental suffering compounded by countless abuses. Many could no longer bear the torment and chose to end their own lives. Tang Menglong and his wife also contemplated suicide but ultimately decided to persevere for the sake of their children, unwilling to leave them uncared for.

Yet these wartime heroes should have been revered by the people they fought to protect. In a peaceful era, they could have continued to serve as vital pillars of national defense and reconstruction, enjoying generous compensation and social care. They might have been honored with medals, invited to schools and government ceremonies to recount their wartime stories, and basked in flowers and applause. If circumstances had been different, they could have lived their later years like Nationalist veterans in Taiwan or Allied forces such as U.S. and British soldiers, receiving substantial welfare and dedicated personal care.

However, history’s complex interplay of coincidence and inevitability, both domestically and internationally, altered the fate of the Chinese people and that of these Nationalist veterans. Instead of receiving recognition, they were plunged into a nightmare. Their dignity and honor were destroyed, along with their basic human rights and reputations. Their monumental contributions were erased, and they were burdened with stigmas like “reactionary Kuomintang,” “landlord/exploiter class,” or “zaoyangjun” (a pejorative term for the Nationalist Army during the Civil War and Mao era).

The experiences and stories of countless Nationalist soldiers—their heroic deeds and the profound emotions and reflections born of war—were enough to inspire a thousand Band of Brothers, The Old Gun, or Saving Private Ryan-like films. Yet these narratives have been irretrievably lost as these veterans were silenced by persecution, driven mad, incapacitated by age or illness, or passed away. Even precious wartime relics were destroyed or lost. For example, Tang Menglong’s certificates and badges honoring his wartime achievements were confiscated during raids or buried underground, only to rot away. Many invaluable artifacts of the resistance, comparable to the Sichuan Army’s “Death Flags” or the wooden carvings of Guangxi Student Army’s pledge to “one day raise the Blue Sky, White Sun flag atop Mount Fuji,” were permanently and irreversibly destroyed.

When Mao Zedong passed away and Hua Guofeng and Deng Xiaoping rose to power, surviving resistance veterans no longer faced brutal persecution for their Nationalist affiliations. However, their honor was not fully restored. Even when they were “rehabilitated,” this only meant an acknowledgment that their persecution was unjust; it did not mean full recognition of their status as anti-Japanese war heroes. Later policies, such as the One-Child Policy and other harmful reforms, continued to wreak havoc on the lives of resistance veterans and the Chinese people as a whole, though the scale of suffering was far less than during Mao’s era. Poverty also continued to plague these wartime heroes and their families.

Another critical factor suppressed the memory and commemoration of these veterans and the War of Resistance itself: the 1980s and 1990s were an era of “Sino-Japanese friendship.” At that time, Japan was an economic powerhouse with advanced technology and immense national strength. Its per capita GDP was over 30 times that of China, and its total GDP was more than five times greater. Due to poverty, China’s urgent need for foreign investment and technology, and its opposition to the Soviet Union (a factor behind Mao’s earlier pro-Japanese stance), the Chinese government pursued a conciliatory policy toward Japan. This “friendship” was achieved at the expense of tolerating Japanese right-wing efforts to deny or glorify its wartime aggression, including visits to the Yasukuni Shrine. When Hirohito, Japan’s primary World War II war criminal, died, China sent a high-level delegation to pay respects. Emperor Akihito even visited China in 1992 and was warmly welcomed.

In this context, both the War of Resistance Against Japan and the soldiers who fought in it were handled with restraint and subdued recognition by both the Chinese government and the general public. Faced with the flood of Japanese goods, culture, and people—ranging from tourists to high-ranking Japanese expatriates enjoying “privileged treatment” in China—veterans of the war, along with survivors of Japanese atrocities, felt deeply conflicted. It is reminiscent of a scene from the anti-Japanese film Encirclement, where Erxi, a villager who had fought the Japanese alongside his brother after losing his family, sits in a daze during his later years, watching a Japanese-made SUV drive past the same dilapidated village he has lived in for decades. Similarly, as recalled by Chinese-Canadian writer Tao Duanfang, a Nationalist veteran who had fought in the Battle of Shanghai in 1937 fainted in the 1980s upon seeing Japan’s national flag displayed at an exposition—overwhelmed by either rage or shock.

Although some efforts were made to commemorate the war, such as the production of films like The Battle of Taierzhuang, the degree of emphasis given to the conflict was far less than its monumental historical significance and impact warranted. It also did not reflect the immense suffering of the Chinese people during the war. As a result, the War of Resistance and its heroes faded into the background in the face of contemporary realities. Many veterans, by then elderly, passed away quietly and unacknowledged.

When comparing the postwar experiences of Japanese soldiers to those of Chinese veterans, the contrast is deeply sobering. After Japan’s defeat in 1945, its economy collapsed, and both soldiers and civilians lived in poverty for a time. Many soldiers who had committed atrocities faced the threat of accountability and trials. However, following the outbreak of the Korean War in 1950, the geopolitical calculus of China (both the Communist and Nationalist sides), the U.S., and the Soviet Union shifted to prioritize Japan’s alliance over justice for its war crimes. As a result, the U.S. provided extensive support to Japan, allowing its economy to recover rapidly without fully eradicating the remnants of militarism. By the 1960s, many former Japanese soldiers who had participated in the invasion of China—including those responsible for arson, murder, and sexual violence—were already receiving “consolation payments” from the Japanese government.

By the 1970s and beyond, most surviving Japanese veterans enjoyed substantial pensions and an enviable standard of living. Many Japanese citizens regarded them as national heroes who had safeguarded Japan and restored its postwar dignity. This reverence was epitomized in 1974 when Hiroo Onoda, a Japanese soldier who had waged guerrilla warfare in the Philippines for decades and only surrendered that year, was welcomed home by throngs of flag-waving Japanese citizens. Meanwhile, most members of the Imperial Japanese Army who had invaded China spent their later years in relative affluence, with access to quality care during illness and old age, and often lived long, comfortable lives.

In stark contrast, the fate of China’s righteous and heroic soldiers is all the more infuriating and heartbreaking. The stark disparity raises profound questions about who the true victors and losers of the war were—China or Japan.

World War II is widely recognized as a decisive event that reshaped humanity’s destiny, determining whether the world would move toward independence, freedom, peace, and prosperity, or remain under fascist tyranny, racial oppression, and the destruction of human dignity. Fortunately, with the courageous efforts of the international anti-fascist coalition, including China’s soldiers, justice triumphed over evil. Yet, Chinese veterans of the War of Resistance—who were instrumental in ushering humanity into an era of unprecedented civilization, peace, and prosperity—did not enjoy the fruits of their victory. Instead, they endured conditions more brutal than wartime, in an environment more impoverished and backward than the one they fought to protect, suffering relentless hardship and humiliation.

It was not until the last few years of the 20th century and the early 21st century, under the leadership of Jiang Zemin and Hu Jintao, that China gradually began to mention the War of Resistance Against Japan, and the veterans of the war received some attention and care. However, by this time, most of the veterans had already passed away, and only a few remained. By the period from 2010 to 2015, when the War of Resistance began to receive broader recognition and was elevated to a noble status, very few veterans were still alive, and the vast majority had already passed on. The deceased veterans, like Tang Menglong, generally lived in poverty and humiliation, and did not live to see the day when they were officially recognized as national heroes and contributors to the nation. Many of them died by suicide under unjust circumstances. Even now, despite the more grandiose commemoration of the War of Resistance, it cannot compensate for the tragedies that have already occurred or the consequences that have been caused, leaving only everlasting regret.

This is the bitter consequence of the actions of the Chinese Communist Party during the Mao era. The achievements of eradicating the anti-Japanese Nationalist forces (during the Cultural Revolution, even the CCP’s own anti-Japanese efforts were erased, and anti-Japanese heroes like Peng Dehuai, who commanded the Hundred Regiments Offensive, and the survivors of the five warriors from Langya Mountain were not spared from persecution), and the brutal suppression of the Nationalist forces who fought in the War of Resistance, destroyed both people and memories at a time when the War of Resistance and its heroes should have been celebrated. This damage is irreparable.

Not only were veterans like Tang Menglong treated so tragically, but survivors of various massacres during the War of Resistance, comfort women, and forced laborers also suffered numerous injustices after the founding of the Communist government. Those who survived remained low-key. Their efforts to defend their rights and seek justice from Japan were suppressed by the Communist Party. By the time the Communist government began to support such rights movements, most of the victims had already passed away, and the survivors still did not receive adequate recognition or care. In contrast, victims of the atomic bombings in Hiroshima and Nagasaki received global attention, with various speeches and even a Nobel Peace Prize awarded to related organizations in 2024. This comparison highlights the bitter reality that, in this context, China appears to be the defeated country, while Japan is regarded as the victor. The greatest regret for the survivors of the War of Resistance is that the memories of most of them have been erased from history, with no preservation or transmission of their stories.

What has been destroyed is not just the grand collective memory of the nation, but also the lives and happiness of individual people. The experiences that Tang Menglong recalls in the documentary, where he was repeatedly persecuted during the Cultural Revolution, are real examples of how basic human dignity, body, and spirit were damaged. These persecutions had an indelible impact on his entire family, leaving visible and invisible scars on his children, who were still young at the time. The long-term poverty induced by the political environment and the family’s vulnerable position in their community continued to trouble Tang Menglong’s family even to this day.

During the War of Resistance, Tang Menglong was fearless in sacrificing himself, bravely fighting the enemy, and defending the country. But in the decades that followed, he was powerless even against malicious neighbors, unable to protect his family, enduring humiliation and having to quietly tolerate it. After enduring various humiliations, Tang Menglong transformed from a spirited general’s guard into a cautious, low-key elderly civilian. Yet when discussing the War of Resistance or singing Nationalist military songs, his heroic nature still shines through. Though he was reserved when talking about events after 1949, he still courageously shared many of his experiences, without numbness or loss of courage.

In his later years, Tang Menglong, along with his middle-aged son, finally gathered the courage to demand an explanation from the old Red Guard neighbors who had once tormented them, following the national commemoration of the War of Resistance and the social recognition of Tang Menglong. The defense given by the former Red Guards, like many others—those who had betrayed or harmed people during the Cultural Revolution—was to justify their actions by citing the unavoidable environment of that time. But any evil is carried out by specific people, many of whom were active participants. Even those who merely followed orders were guilty of what has been described as “the banality of evil.” They may have had their own justifications, but if we forgive them, where does that leave the victims? Without distinguishing right from wrong, social morality decays further, and in the confusion between good and evil, more harm can emerge.

The changes in Tang Menglong’s family circumstances were also shaped and determined by national policies and the broader environment. During the thirty years when Satan-like figures were in power, Tang Menglong’s family could only struggle in despair, with life and death in the hands of fate and unable to resist, like fish on the chopping block, at the mercy of others. During Deng Xiaoping’s era, although there was a glimmer of hope and the end of the “untouchable” status, they could only live quietly, too afraid to demand justice. It was only when a new era came that they received some recognition in terms of spirit and reputation. Every individual, under the pressure and manipulation of Leviathan and the shaping of the broader environment, had little autonomy. Various harms, tortures, and the terrifying shadow of fear made people hesitant to resist and claim their rights, even when they were safe. Tang Menglong did not actively fight for compensation and treatment during the 1980s’ “rectification of wrongs” because of his fear that the Mao-era terror might return. The fear of tyranny caused people to “voluntarily” give up their rights, which in itself is a crime of tyranny.

Although after 2013, Tang Menglong’s family finally gained some societal recognition and widespread respect, the mundane matters of life, such as food, medicine, and the inevitable passage of time, continued to trouble him and his family. Interviews and watching military parades brought temporary joy, but everyday life was marked by long-lasting desolation. Family conflicts and the sorrow of having no filial children by the bedside during long illnesses were also present in Tang Menglong’s family. Even great men and immortal achievements cannot offset the hardships of life.

The level of care that society shows to veterans like Tang Menglong is uncertain, partly genuine and partly a facade. Tang Menglong’s daughter’s experience of being rejected when seeking help from charity organizations reflects that the halo of being a war veteran does not bring much tangible help. In China, poverty is still widespread, society remains fragmented, and many public welfare organizations are ineffective. From the Communist Party’s high levels to grassroots organizations, how many really admire his achievements in fighting the Japanese, and how many are simply exploiting him?

Tang Menglong’s achievements were during the War of Resistance Against Japan, but the humiliation and suffering he endured occurred mainly in the decades after the war, in the post-war years. In other words, it was another war outside the war of resistance—a continuous tragedy of fratricidal conflict, a one-sided massacre of unarmed fellow citizens by those in control of the state’s machinery of violence. This is even harder to understand and accept than being tortured by the enemy or dying on the battlefield. In his later years, Tang Menglong refused to wear the medal given to him by the Communist Party/China’s Central Military Commission, which can be seen as his final form of resistance—rejecting and “not cooperating” to denounce the persecution and trauma of those decades that should not be forgotten.

In 2017, Tang Menglong completed his tortuous life and bade farewell to a world that had granted him high honors but also caused him immense suffering. His family continued to live in the mixed joys and sorrows of everyday life.

Tang Menglong was unfortunate—he endured the Japanese invasion of China in his youth and saw his homeland shattered; after 1949, he faced numerous calamities, being harmed by his own countrymen, and his later years were not particularly happy. However, Tang Menglong was also fortunate, for many more Chinese people and many more veterans of the War of Resistance were even more unfortunate, suffering greater persecution and injustice, dying earlier, and quietly aging without recognition. Tang Menglong lived to see the time when the government and society finally recognized him, and he was able to be interviewed and filmed, speaking out the words he once could not speak and could not make known, leaving the world with some images and memories.

Not only Tang Menglong, but in recent years, most of the veterans of the War of Resistance, survivors of the Nanjing Massacre, survivors of comfort women, and others have passed away, with only a few remaining. The echoes of an era, which should not have ended yet (because there are still many untold stories, unresolved issues, and justice yet to be achieved), have already irreversibly faded into permanent silence.

We thank those who care for the veterans of the War of Resistance, for capturing the last living witnesses of that tragic era in the fleeting passage of time, leaving behind images and sounds, allowing history to be remembered even after it has passed, and allowing the lives that have passed away to live on in another way.

 近日，我观看了反映国军抗战英雄唐梦龙战后经历和晚年境遇的纪录片《将军的卫士》。对于这部纪录片及反映的历史与现实，我也有些话颇想说一说。

   纪录片的主人公唐梦龙，曾是国军名将宋希濂的卫兵。1937年卢沟桥事变，唐梦龙为抵抗日寇、保家卫国而参加国军。唐梦龙和宋将军及其他战友一起，从1937年到1945年，经历了残酷的抗日战争，还在战争中负伤，以血肉保卫了国家民族。战后，又随宋希濂前往新疆。唐梦龙及与他一样的数百万国军官兵，作为战胜国劳苦功高的英雄，为国人（乃至整个世界反法西斯阵营人民）敬仰，也正有着光明的前程。

   但之后，国共内战爆发，仅仅四年，中共军队就击败国军，宋希濂也在大西南被中共俘虏。而复员回乡的唐梦龙，以及他的妻子和儿女，就在中共建政后、毛时代的约三十年里，历经许多政治运动，尤其“文化大革命”的摧残。这也是许多“解甲归田”甚至起义投共的国军官兵想不到的。

   “换了人间”的“新中国”，是不认这些抗战英雄的。相反，这些国军（“国民革命军”，也被称为“国民党军”，称呼哪个就看立场和角度了）官兵，哪怕在抗日战争中劳苦功高，也还是“国民党反动派”。在毛时代，主旋律是讲阶级斗争、反国民党统治，抗日根本不是功绩（毛时代不纪念抗战、不提南京大屠杀，还支持日本反美），但身份是国民党/国民政府人士，那就是极大的罪过（哪怕毛泽东自己也曾在第一次国共合作时当过国民党高官）。

  在1950年的“镇压反革命运动”中，许多辛亥革命和抗日战争英雄，被中共处决。还有的被送往贫瘠落后之地“劳动改造”；反右运动，许多参加抗战的知识分子被批判和流放；大饥荒期间，许多被劳改的（往往曾捱过日本侵华战争残酷）的国军官兵、服务于国府且同样参与抗战的知识分子，饿死在流放地。之后又有“四清运动”，将曾参加国民党的中共成员加以甄别和迫害。这些运动和灾难，已经摧毁了大多数抗战功臣的人生前途、个人生活甚至生命。

   唐梦龙侥幸的没有死于以上动荡，生还下来。可更残酷的“文化大革命”等着他及其他国军幸存者。在中共都承认是“浩劫”的文革十年，唐梦龙和妻子等家人被红卫兵批斗、殴打，他做红卫兵的邻里，不仅一直欺压他，甚至试图杀害他。幸亏他逃到荒山躲避，靠家人偷偷送饭，才逃过一劫。到了晚年，唐梦龙夫妇还心有余悸，唐家对前红卫兵恶邻也仍有惧怕。

  唐梦龙的妻子，是共产党员，青年时是标准的“进步青年”，曾不顾家庭亲族利益，为困难中的中共军队提供粮食和金钱。但文革中狂热的红卫兵同样没有放过她，她被迫害的终生残疾，后半生以拐杖相伴。这样的境遇，同样是从刘少奇邓小平等中共高干，到许多基层党员共同遭遇的悲剧。唐梦龙夫妇的遭遇，是毛时代中国前国民党人和共产党人遭遇的缩影，是见证者和幸存者。

  毛泽东时代的约三十年，抗战的国军官兵，如同在地狱里。许多人已经死去，幸存者饱受屈辱，“祗辱于奴隶人之手，骈死于槽枥之间”，尊严丧尽，还要再于其肉体和精神上“踏上一万只脚”。许多人就自杀了。唐梦龙夫妇也想过自杀。只是他们看到还有孩子，不希望抛下年幼的孩子无人照看，才忍着苟活下去。

   而他们，这些抗战军人，本应该被国人敬仰，在和平年代继续作为保卫民族和建设国家的骨干，得到丰厚的报酬和生活照顾，时常披红挂彩在政府和学校讲述抗战、享受无数鲜花和掌声。若是这样，他们会像撤到台湾的国军、作为盟友的美军英军年老时一样，有优厚福利和专人照看。

   但历史的各种巧合，必然和偶然、中国国内和国际局势的风云际会，改变了中国人民的命运，也改变了这些抗战军人的命运，将他们推进了地狱，毁灭了他们的尊严与荣誉，甚至做人的基本权利和名誉都被剥夺。他们的惊天功绩被完全抹杀，还背上“国民党反动派”、“地主/剥削阶级”、“遭殃军（国共内战和毛时代对中央军的蔑称）”等各种污名。

    许多抗战军人和他们抗战中经历的事，许多思考和情感，即便拍摄一万部《兄弟连》、《老枪》、《拯救大兵瑞恩》影片都用不完题材的、令人深刻思考的、感人至深的真实故事，都随着他们被迫害的沉默寡言、疯癫、因病和年老失能、死去，而永久淹没、灭失了。那些重要的战争遗物，也都毁坏了、遗失了。就像唐梦龙获得的各种抗战荣誉证书、徽章，有的被抄家没收，有的埋藏地下而腐坏。许多可与川军“死字旗”和广西学生军在木头所刻“终有一天让青天白日旗飘扬在富士山头”比拟的珍贵抗战遗产文物，都被永久性和不可逆的毁坏了。

  等到毛泽东死去、华国锋和邓小平相继上台，幸存的抗战军人，虽不再因其国民党/国军身份受残酷迫害，却也并没有恢复荣誉。即便“平反”，也只是否定了迫害，而非充分承认其抗战英雄的身份。之后，计划生育及其他恶政，也继续摧残着抗战军人在内的中国人民（虽然整体迫害程度比毛时代低多了）。而贫穷也困扰着这些抗战英雄及其家人。

  还有一个重要背景，也在压抑着抗战军人及整个中华民族对抗战的记忆与追思。1980-1990年代，是宣扬“中日友好”的年代。当时的日本，经济极为繁荣、科技发达、国力强盛，人均GDP是中国的30倍以上，GDP总量也比中国多5倍以上。那时的中国，因为贫穷、急需外国投资和技术，中共反苏联的需要等（毛时代对日友好也是为反美反苏），都让中国走向对日亲善，且是以姑息日本右翼否认甚至美化战争、参拜靖国神社等恶行实现的“中日友好”。日本二战头号战犯天皇裕仁去世时，中国派遣高规格代表团吊唁。日本天皇明仁还在1992年访问中国，受到热情接待。

   这样的背景下，抗日战争、抗战军人，都被中共官方和中国民间低调对待。面对潮水般涌入的日货、日本文化、日本人（包括日本游客、较高阶级且享受中国“超国民待遇”的日本来华工作者），中国的抗战军人、中国抗战和日本屠杀幸存者们，心里五味杂陈。就像一部抗日电影《围剿》中，那位因家人被杀、和兄弟一起血战日军的村民二喜，晚年在与几十年前几乎同样破落的自家村庄里，看到门前驶过的日产SUV，发呆迷惘。还有据旅加华人陶短房老师回忆，他认识的一位参加淞沪会战的国军老兵，1980年代看见博览会日本国旗，直接昏倒在地（或是愤怒或是惊吓）。

   虽然那时也有一些抗战宣传和记忆，如《血战台儿庄》等影片，但对抗战的提及程度，远不及抗战极为重大的历史地位和影响，也不匹配中国人民抗战中的巨大苦难。抗日战争、抗战英雄，都在现实面前沉寂了。许多抗战军人，也已步入老年，纷纷的、默默的去世了。

   而若对比侵略中国的日本军人战后境遇，中国抗战军人的遭遇和待遇更令人唏嘘。虽然日本在1945年战败后一度经济崩坏、军人和平民贫困。许多作恶的军人还一度面临被追责和审判的下场。但1950年朝鲜战争后，中（包括共产党和国民党两方）美苏各方为拉拢日本放弃追责，美国全面扶植日本。日本在未消除军国主义根底同时，经济迅速复苏，1960年代，包括参与侵略中国、在中国烧杀奸淫的许多旧日本军人，已开始领取日本政府的“慰问金”。

   那些活到1970年代及之后的旧日本军人，更是普遍获得不菲收入、享受到非常优渥的生活条件。许多日本民众也把这些军人视为保卫国家、让日本战后重新得到尊重的英雄。这从在菲律宾长期游击战、1974年才投降的小野田宽郎回到日本时，得到日本民众吃日本国旗夹道欢迎，就能看出（其他“残留日本兵”如横井庄一回国后，也得到了类似礼遇和优待）。大多数侵华日军，晚年都算物质丰富、生活幸福，患病和衰老往往有护理者照顾，也颇长寿，安享晚年。

   两厢对比，正义的中国军人，其不公和凄苦，更令人悲愤。这也让人对中国和日本，究竟谁算是战胜国、谁才是战败国，产生深深的疑问。

   第二次世界大战，被世界广泛认为是改变人类命运的决定性事件，它决定了人类走向独立自由、和平繁荣，还是法西斯暴政、种族压迫、对人性的摧残。幸运的是，在包括中国军人在内国际反法西斯阵营的勇敢奋战下，正义战胜了邪恶。但中国抗战军人，作为开创人类新纪元、让人类走入有史以来最为文明、和平、繁荣时代的功勋者，却没有享受到文明、和平、繁荣，反而处在野蛮残暴胜于战争、贫乏落后恶于战前的环境中，饱经苦难和屈辱。

   直到上世纪最后几年和21世纪初，江泽民和胡锦涛执政，因为多种原因，中国才逐渐提及抗日战争，抗战老兵也得到一些关注和关怀。但这时，大多数抗战老兵都已故去，活着的是少数。而到2010-2015年、抗战被更广泛关注、被强调到崇高地位时，抗战老兵已百不存一，绝大多数都已长眠了。那些去世的抗战老兵，境遇与唐梦龙大同小异，生前普遍是贫穷而屈辱的，也没有像唐梦龙那样看到被国人普遍重新认可为民族英雄、国家功臣的那天。许多人还是含冤自杀的。即便现在抗战纪念再隆重，也无法弥补已经发生的悲剧、已造成的后果，留下的是永远的遗憾。

  而这正是毛泽东时代中共所作所为的恶果。灭杀抗战国军的功绩（文革时，甚至对中共自己抗日功绩也抹杀、中共抗战英雄也迫害，如指挥百团大战的彭德怀、狼牙山五壮士幸存者，也没有逃过迫害）、残酷迫害抗战国军，在最应该宣传抗日战争、褒扬抗战英雄的时期，毁掉了人与记忆。这样的损害，是永远无法弥补的。

    不仅唐梦龙这样的抗战老兵如此凄惨，抗日战争中各次屠杀都幸存者、“慰安妇”幸存者、被强征的劳工幸存者等，也都在中共建政后遭遇许多次伤害，幸存下来的也非常低调。他们的维权、向日本讨还公道的活动，还被中共官方压制。到了中共官方支持维权时，绝大多数人已经去世，且幸存者仍然没有得到足够曝光和关怀。而日本广岛、长崎原子弹受害者，却在全世界都得到关注、进行各种演讲，相关团体还获得2024年诺贝尔和平奖。两厢对比，又是中国才像战败国、日本才是战胜国的现实。抗战幸存者们最遗憾的、最令人痛心的，就是其中绝大多数人的记忆被湮灭于历史，没有保留和传承下来。

   摧毁的，不只是宏大的民族和共同记忆，当然也包括每个具体的人的生活与幸福。纪录片中唐梦龙回忆的文革中屡遭迫害的经历，实实在在的在损害着一个人基本的尊严、肉体、精神。这些迫害也对其整个家庭及每个家庭成员，产生了难以磨灭的影响，给当时年纪尚幼的唐梦龙子女留下有形无形的创伤和阴影。而大环境和政治迫害促成的家庭长期的贫困、与邻里关系中的弱势，也困扰着唐梦龙一家至今。

  唐梦龙在抗战中不怕牺牲、奋勇杀敌、保卫国家。可之后几十年，他却连恶邻都无法抵敌、对家人都无力保护，被欺凌只能忍耐、遇到危险只好躲避。经历各种折辱，唐梦龙也从意气风发的将军卫士，变成低调谨慎的平民老人。但谈到抗战、唱起国军抗战歌曲，仍然能看到他英雄的本色。对1949后的事，虽颇有保留，但也勇敢的说了许多经历，没有麻木和丧失勇气。

   晚年的唐梦龙，以及他已中年的儿子，在全国纪念抗战、唐梦龙被社会肯定下，才鼓起勇气向当年欺凌他们的老红卫兵邻居讨说法。而老红卫兵的说辞，与其他许多老红卫兵、告密者、作恶者一样，以文革那种环境的不得已来辩解。可任何恶都是由具体的人参与和执行的，很多人还是积极主动参与，且即便只是执行上面的意思，也有“平庸之恶”。他们或许也有不得已，可若原谅他们，又置受害者于何地？若没了是非，社会道德更加败坏，善恶混淆下会有更多恶的滋生。

   而唐梦龙一家境遇的变化，也是国家政策、大环境塑造和决定。撒旦般人物在位那三十年，唐梦龙一家只能在绝望中挣扎，生死有命无力反抗，如案板鱼肉任人宰割。邓时期虽柳暗花明、结束“贱民”待遇，却只能低调过日子，哪敢奢求正义。等到新的时期，才算在精神和名誉上得到了肯定。每个个体都在利维坦的威压与操控下，在大环境的塑造下，没有什么自主。各种伤害折磨、恐怖阴霾，让人们在安全时也不敢反抗和争取权利。唐梦龙没有在1980年代“平反冤假错案”时及时积极争取待遇和补偿，并不是他不愿意要，只是害怕毛时代那些卷土重来。暴政的恐惧让人“主动”放弃权利，这本身就是暴政的罪恶。

   虽然唐梦龙一家，在2013年之后，终于算是获得社会肯定、受到广泛尊重。但柴米油盐和生老病死，许多琐事、俗事、家事，仍然在困扰着唐梦龙和他家人。接受采访、观看阅兵，只有一时的欢欣，日常则是长久的落寞。家庭矛盾、久病床前无孝子，同样发生在唐梦龙一家。伟大的人、不朽的功绩，也抵消不了这些生活的困境。

   而社会对于唐梦龙这样抗战老兵的关怀，几分真几分假、多少虚多少实，也都在不定之中。唐梦龙女儿谈到去慈善机构求助被拒，就反映了抗战老兵的光环，并不能带来多少实际帮助。中国，仍然是普遍贫穷、社会散沙状、公益组织尸位素餐的。从中共高层到基层各种组织，各方的宣传，有多少真的是敬佩他抗日功绩，又多少只是在利用他呢？

   唐梦龙的功绩，是在抗日战争期间；而其所受的屈辱和苦难，却主要是在战后几十年，是在战争之外。或者说，是抗战之外又一场战争，是连续不断的同胞相残的悲剧，是掌握国家暴力机器一方对手无寸铁的同族同胞的单方面杀戮。这比被敌人折磨、战死沙场，更加难以理解和接受。唐梦龙老人在晚年，拒绝佩戴中共/中国中央军委给他的勋章，算是他最后的某种反抗，是以拒绝和“不合作”来控诉那几十年不应一笔勾销的迫害与创伤。

    2017年，唐梦龙走完了曲折的人生，告别了这给他赋予了崇高荣誉，也带来过巨大苦难的人间。唐梦龙的家人，也继续生活在悲欢离合五味杂陈的俗世中。

    唐梦龙是不幸的，他青年时遭遇日本侵华、山河破碎；在1949年后，又遭遇了太多劫难、被同胞残害，晚年也并不算很幸福。但唐梦龙又是幸运的，因为还有更多中国人、更多抗战军人更不幸，遭受更大的迫害和冤屈、更早的去世，以及默默无闻的老去。唐梦龙毕竟活到了被政府和社会重新认可的时候，还得到了采访和拍摄，说出了以前不敢说、说了也不能广为人知的肺腑之言，也算是给世界留下了一些影像和记忆。

   不仅唐梦龙，就在最近这几年，抗战老兵、南京大屠杀幸存者、“慰安妇”幸存者等，基本都已去世，剩下的寥寥无几。一个时代的余音，本来还没到应该结束的时候（因为还有许多尚无诉说的故事、尚待解决的问题、尚未实现的正义），却已经不可逆转的走向永久静默。

   感谢关怀抗战老兵的人们，抓住了飞逝时光中那个悲壮时代最后的、活的见证，留下了影像和声音，让历史在过去后还被记住，让逝去的生命以另外的方式永生。

“The death of one child in China has triggered such intense emotions in Japan. How do you think the people of Asia, who suffered under Japanese militarism, feel?

Put yourself in their shoes: Japanese courts still use the excuse of ‘state non-liability’ to dismiss the claims of Chinese and Korean victims’ families. How do you think those families feel?”

Recently, on the sensitive date of September 18, a “black swan” incident involving foreign nationals occurred in China: a 10-year-old Japanese boy was fatally stabbed on his way to school in Shenzhen by a 44-year-old Chinese man. Following the incident, public opinion in Japan surged, and some Japanese media interpreted the event as a reflection of anti-Japanese sentiment in China.

Indeed, there is a pervasive atmosphere of anti-Japanese sentiment among the Chinese public. This stems not only from historical grievances but also from Japan’s recent alignment with the U.S. Indo-Pacific strategy, forming alliances with countries like the U.S., India, and Australia, and aggressively promoting the “China threat” narrative. Japan has even declared that “a Taiwan contingency is a Japan contingency, and a Japan contingency is a U.S.-Japan alliance contingency.”

However, anti-Japanese sentiment does not equate to a loss of rationality among the Chinese public. In the past, the compassionate Chinese people repaid hostility with kindness, adopting numerous Japanese orphans after Japan’s defeat in World War II. Even now, they would not vent their anger on ordinary Japanese citizens, let alone innocent Japanese children. Just three months ago, in Suzhou, a Chinese woman, Hu Youping, sacrificed her own life to save a Japanese mother and child—something any reasonable person could recognize as an act of human decency.

In China, where various social contradictions, conflicts, and difficulties intertwine, public safety—particularly the safety of primary and secondary school students—has always been a critical issue requiring strict vigilance. Today, primary, secondary, and even university campuses are equipped with security personnel and guards. Even parents cannot freely enter school premises; they must first contact the school and obtain approval. Such measures were unheard of during my generation.

Despite these precautions, some incidents remain unavoidable. For example, two years ago in Mizhi County, Shaanxi Province, a man surnamed Zhao killed eight or nine elementary school students at the school gate. His motive? He was frustrated by his own failures in life and unleashed his malice on defenseless children. Thus, the tragic incident in Shenzhen on September 18, involving the murder of a Japanese child, appears to be an isolated criminal case with clear antisocial tendencies. What makes it noteworthy is its timing—occurring on September 18, a historically sensitive date, targeting a Japanese elementary school student, and coinciding with a highly delicate period in Sino-Japanese relations. Unlike the Suzhou incident involving Hu Youping, there was no act of heroism to counterbalance this tragedy.

This event is unrelated to China’s patriotic education or the establishment of National Humiliation Day. The principle of “remembering the past to guide the future” remains relevant, particularly as Japan has yet to deeply reflect on and sincerely apologize for its wartime atrocities against China and other Asian nations. Moreover, Japan continues to interfere in the Taiwan Strait and provoke China. Under such circumstances, China will not cease its patriotic education or commemoration of National Humiliation Day. Japan itself quietly regards August 15 (the date of its surrender in World War II) as its own “National Humiliation Day” and commemorates it annually. However, Japan’s perspective on this “humiliation” is historically distorted—China often views it as a dangerous signal of Japan’s attempts to abolish its pacifist constitution and revive militarism.

That said, the Chinese side has its own shortcomings to reflect upon after the incident. Perhaps out of concern for maintaining the overall stability of Sino-Japanese relations, the authorities downplayed the event and did not promptly address concerns raised by relevant parties. Furthermore, the measures to regulate and punish a small number of ignorant and shallow individuals exploiting “patriotic sentiment” for attention online have been insufficient. In many cases, even isolated incidents require heightened vigilance to prevent them from escalating into irrational populist sentiment. Recently, a deputy county governor on secondment in Sichuan reportedly made extreme comments online, such as, “Killing one child is no big deal,” and “It’s not indiscriminate killing—it was just a little Japanese kid.” Such remarks have sparked attention and condemnation in China’s public opinion space. Although this individual is under official investigation, the government must deeply reflect: how was someone so unqualified and cold-hearted selected for such a position? If this person were to climb higher in rank, where would they lead the country?

According to reports, Japan remains dissatisfied with the Chinese government’s response to the September 18 case. Japanese media have suggested that treating “this incident as a simple street murder would be a grave mistake.” While this interpretation is clearly irrational, it is not entirely incomprehensible. After all, the victim was one of their own citizens, and a child no less. But shouldn’t they also consider: if the death of one child in China can provoke such intense emotions in Japan, how did the peoples of Asia, who suffered immensely under Japanese militarism, feel back then?

Empathy matters. Japanese courts still dismiss claims from Chinese and Korean victims’ families, citing “state non-liability.” How do you think those families feel?

September 18 is a day of profound sorrow for all Chinese people, but China does not wish to turn this date—79 years later—into one of mourning for Japanese children and ordinary Japanese citizens. Nor does it want to make it a day of shared grief for both Chinese and Japanese people. In my opinion, this reflects the thoughts and feelings of all rational Chinese citizens.

(This article was published in Lianhe Zaobao. The author, Yang Jianye, is a professor at Xi’an University of Science and Technology.)

Original title: “Yang Jianye: The ‘Black Swan’ Incident on September 18 Requires Deep Reflection”